ARFF Daily News

Friday the 26th of April, 2024

"Roughest landing': Watch video of plane bouncing off runway as it attempts to land at LAX

Saman Shafiq - USA TODAY

A Boeing 747 operated by Lufthansa Airlines ran into a couple of bumps as it landed at LAX Airport in Los Angeles.

Video footage of the landing, captured by Airlines Videos Live, shows the aircraft skidding on the runway and then bouncing off the ground as it attempts to land. The plane then takes off again, flying for a few minutes before successfully landing.

"What? Whoa, whoa, whoa," the commentator of the livestream could be heard saying. "We're getting that go around. Holy moly. Wow. That is the roughest landing I think we've ever caught on our broadcast."

A Boeing 747-8 Lufthansa flight was scheduled to land around 1 p.m. ET at LAX after a more than 11-hour flight from Frankfurt, Germany, LAX's website shows.

No injuries reported

Lufthansa Airlines, in an email statement to USA TODAY, said that Flight LH 456 from Frankfurt to Los Angeles had a "rough landing" Tuesday. 326 passengers and 19 crew members were on board the flight and no injuries were reported.

The airline said the plane later flew back to Frankfurt following "an assessment by the cockpit crew, a consultation with the technical department on site and in Frankfurt and an initial visual inspection," where it will undergo further inspection. Lufthansa did not specify if the plane flew back empty or had passengers on board.

Airline Videos Live captures planes as they take off and land at LAX Airport. The livestream was created in 2019 by Los Angeles TV News photojournalist Kevin Ray, according to the YouTube channel account description.

While Boeing incidents have been in the news in recent months after a series of high-profile incidents, aviation experts maintain you shouldn't worry about flying.

“We don’t have to worry that there’s something systemically wrong with aviation,” Clint Balog, an associate professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, previously told USA TODAY.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/airline-news/2024/04/24/lufthansa-plane-bumpy-landing-lax-video/73439999007/

NTSB Prelim: Piper Aircraft Inc PA-44-180

Controller Asked The Instructor If She Wanted To Declare An Emergency, And She Replied “Yes”

Location: Fort Pierce North, FL Accident Number: ERA24FA157
Date & Time: March 30, 2024, 13:20 Local Registration: N595ND
Aircraft: Piper Aircraft Inc PA-44-180 Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Instructional

On March 30, 2024, about 1320 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-44-180, N595ND, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident at the Treasure Coast International Airport (FPR), Fort Pierce, Florida. The flight instructor was fatally injured, and the private pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.

The private pilot was training for his multi-engine rating at the time of the accident. He and the flight instructor departed FPR about 1140 and climbed to 5,000 ft mean sea level (msl), where they practiced single-engine emergency procedures. These procedures included shutting down and feathering the right engine. They returned to the airport and performed a simulated single-engine instrument “low” approach to runway 10R. To simulate the engine failure, thrust on the right engine was reduced to idle. The left engine was operated normally.

The private pilot said that when the airplane (file photo, below) was at 1,000 ft msl, he extended the landing gear and brought the mixture and propeller levers for both engines full forward. When the airplane reached the minimum descent altitude for the approach (about 400 ft), he executed a missed approach. He brought both throttles full forward to go-around, but there was no thrust on either engine. The pilot said he made a right turn to the missed approach heading provided by Air Traffic Control (ATC). The instructor then took control of the airplane. She declared an emergency and continued to turn the airplane back toward the airport to try to land on runway 14; however, they had “no airspeed and no engine thrust.” The airplane stalled and impacted the ground.

A preliminary review of ATC communications revealed the flight instructor informed the control tower that she wanted to return to the traffic pattern. She stated they were “single engine” and two people on board. The controller asked the instructor if she wanted to declare an emergency, and she replied “yes.” The controller then cleared the airplane to land on any runway.

A witness in an airplane parked near taxiway echo stated that he observed the accident airplane in a “moderate” right bank turn at a “slow speed heading in his direction.” The airplane appeared to stall, rolled right, inverted, and impacted the ground. The witness said the engine power “sounded normal for this aircraft type at the time of the stall.” The airplane came to rest inverted on the airport ramp. There was no postimpact fire. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident scene. The flaps were retracted, and the landing gear were fully extended. Flight control continuity was established for all major flight controls to the cockpit area. Both wing fuel tanks were breached from impact; however, continuity of the fuel system was confirmed to both engines.

The left engine remained attached to the airframe, but the propeller separated at the crankshaft. Both blades were twisted in the hub and exhibited rotational scoring at the tips. The engine was rotated via the vacuum pump spline. As the engine was rotated, compression and valve train continuity were established on all four cylinders. Both magnetos were removed and rotated via a drill. Spark was produced to each ignition tower. The air filter was absent of debris. The spark plugs appeared gray in color consistent with normal wear per the Champion Check-A-Plug chart.

The carburetor was removed from the left engine. The throttle lever was found in the full power position and the mixture control lever was in the full rich position. Fuel was found in the carburetor bowl. The fuel was tested for the presence of water, and none was observed. The fuel screen was absent of debris.

The right engine separated from the airframe and came to rest next to the right wing. The propeller remained attached to the engine. Both propeller blades appeared straight with some damage observed near the tip of one of the blades. The right engine was rotated manually via the propeller. As the engine was rotated, compression and valve train continuity were established to each cylinder except the No. 1 cylinder due to impact damage. Both magnetos were removed and rotated via a drill. Spark was produced to each ignition tower. The air filter was absent of debris. The spark plugs appeared inconsistent in coloration. The No. 2 top and No. 4 bottom spark plugs were gray in color and consistent with normal wear per the Champion Check-A-Plug chart.

However, the other spark plugs had varying degrees of discoloration not consistent with normal wear. The No. 1 bottom spark plug electrodes had no gap on one side and the No. 3 bottom plug had two excessively tight gaps to the electrode. The carburetor was removed from the right engine. The mixture control arm was secured to the mixture control lever via a castle nut and cotter pin. As first viewed the mixture was halfway between full rich and idle cut-off. The throttle control arm was secured to the throttle control arm lever via castle nut and cotter pin. The serrated interface between the throttle arm and throttle arm lever was not securely mated and the throttle arm lever could be fully rotated without moving the throttle arm. The teeth on the throttle arm side appeared to be rounded and worn down.

The throttle plate was in the fully closed position, and the throttle control assembly was impact damaged. Fuel was found in the carburetor bowl. The fuel was tested for the presence of water, and none was observed. The fuel screen was absent of debris.

The carburetor was retained by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for further examination of the throttle lever arm assembly. A review of maintenance records revealed that the last annual inspection conducted on the airplane and both engines was competed the day before the accident on March 29, 2024. At that time, the airframe total time in service was 6,980.8 hours. Total time since overhaul for both engines was 196.4 hours.

The airplane was equipped with an Avidyne Entegra electronic flight display which included a primary flight display (PFD) and a multi-function display (MFD). The units were removed, and the compact flash (CF) card from the MFD was removed. The CF card and the PFD were sent to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory to be downloaded.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov

Today in History

30 Years ago today: On 26 April 1994 a China Airlines Airbus A300 crashed on approach to Nagoya; killing 264 out of 271 occupants.

Date: Tuesday 26 April 1994

Time: 20:16

Type:    Airbus A300B4-622R

Owner/operator: China Airlines

Registration: B-1816

MSN: 580

Year of manufacture: 1990

Total airframe hrs: 8572 hours

Cycles: 3910 flights

Engine model: Pratt & Whitney PW4158

Fatalities: Fatalities: 264 / Occupants: 271

Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off

Category: Accident

Location: Nagoya-Komaki International Airport (NGO) -   Japan

Phase: Approach

Nature: Passenger - Scheduled

Departure airport: Taipei-Chiang Kai Shek International Airport (TPE/RCTP)

Destination airport: Nagoya-Komaki International Airport (NGO/RJNN)

Investigating agency: AAIC

Confidence Rating:  Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:

China Airlines Flight 140 departed from Taipei International Airport, Taiwan, bound for Nagoya Airport, Japan. After initial descent and contact with Nagoya Approach Control, the flight was cleared for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 34 (ILS 34 approach) and was switched to the Nagoya tower frequency at approximately 2007 local time. It was nighttime and Nagoya airport weather at the time was reported as winds from 280 degrees at 8 knots, visibility of 20 kilometers, cumulus clouds at 3,000 feet and a temperature of 20 degrees Celsius. During the initial phase of the approach, both autopilot systems (AP1 and AP2) were engaged as well as the auto throttles. After passing the ILS outer marker and receiving landing clearance, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, disengaged the autopilot system and continued the ILS approach manually.

When passing through approximately 1,000 feet on the approach glidepath, the first officer inadvertently triggered the GO levers placing the auto throttles into go-around mode, which led to an increase in thrust. This increase in thrust caused the aircraft to level off at approximately 1,040 feet for 15 seconds and resulted in the flight path becoming high relative to the ILS glideslope. The captain recognized that the GO lever had been triggered and instructed the first officer to disengage it and correct the flight path down to the desired glide slope. While manually trying to correct the glide path with forward yoke, the first officer engaged the autopilot, causing it to be engaged in the go-around mode as well. As he manually attempted to recapture the glide slope from above by reducing thrust and pushing the yoke forward, he was providing pitch inputs to the elevator that were opposite the autopilot commands to the THS, which was attempting to command pitch up for a go around.

The THS progressively moved from -5.3 degrees to its maximum nose-up limit of approximately -12.3 degress as the aircraft passed through approximately 880 feet. During this period the first officer continued to apply increasing manual nose-down command through forward yoke control which resulted in increasing nose-down elevator movement, opposite the THS movement, masking the out-of-trim condition. The first officer attempted to use the pitch trim control switch to reduce the control force required on the yoke. However, because pitch trim control of the THS is inhibited during autopilot operation, it had no effect. In a normal, trimmed condition the THS and elevator should remain closely aligned. However, because of the opposing autopilot (nose up) commanded THS and manually commanded elevator (nose down) for approximately 30 seconds, the THS and elevator became "mis-trimmed".

Passing through approximately 700 feet, the autopilot was disengaged but the THS remained at its last commanded position of -12.3 degrees. Also at this time, due to the thrust reduction commanded by the first officer, the airspeed decreased to a low level, resulting in an increasing angle of attack (also termed alpha, or AOA). As a result, the automatic alpha floor function of the aircraft was activated, causing an increase in thrust and a further pitch-up. The alpha floor function of the A300 is an AOA protection feature intended to prevent excessive angles of attack during normal operations. Because of the greater size of the THS relative to the elevator (approximately three times greater in terms of surface area), the available elevator control power or authority was overcome as the aircraft neared 570 feet on the approach. Upon hearing the first officer report that he could not push the nose further down and that the throttles had latched (alpha floor function engaged), the captain took over the controls unaware of the THS position.

Upon assuming control, the captain initially attempted to continue the approach but was surprised by the strong resistive force to his full nose-down control inputs. He retarded the throttles in an attempt to recapture glide slope. Unable to control the increasing nose-up pitch, which had reached 22 degrees, he called for the GO-lever shortly thereafter in attempt to execute a go around. The increasing thrust added additional nose-up pitch moment and resulted in and uncontrolled steep climb as airspeed continued to decrease and AOA continued to rise. During the attempted go-around, the captain only operated the pitch trim briefly, indicating he was unaware of the mis-trimmed position (extreme nose-up) of the THS. Furthermore, flaps/slats had been retracted two positions (30/40 to 15/15) to the go-around setting, which increased the airplane pitch up and reduced the stall margin. The aircraft continued to climb steeply up to 1,730 feet with AOA rapidly increasing and airspeed decreasing, reaching a maximum pitch angle of approximately 53 degrees until the stall warning and subsequent stall.

Once stalled the aircraft nose lowered to a steep dive and the captain applied full aft yoke in an attempt to recover from the dive; however, the aircraft remained stalled until impacting the ground tail-first, 300 feet to the right of the runway and burst into flames.



CAUSES: While the aircraft was making an ILS approach to runway 34 of Nagoya Airport, under manual control by the F/O, the F/O inadvertently activated the GO lever, which changed the FD (Flight Director) to GO AROUND mode and caused a thrust increase. This made the aircraft deviate above its normal glide path. The APs were subsequently engaged, with GO AROUND mode still engaged. Under these conditions the F/O continued pushing the control wheel in accordance with the CAP's instructions. As a result of this, the THS (Horizontal Stabilizer) moved to its full nose-up position and caused an abnormal out-of-trim situation. The crew continued approach, unaware of the abnormal situation. The AOA increased the Alpha Floor function was activated and the pitch angle increased.

It is considered that, at this time, the CAP (who had now taken the controls), judged that landing would be difficult and opted for go-around. The aircraft began to climb steeply with a high pitch angle attitude. The CAP and the F/O did not carry out an effective recovery operation, and the aircraft stalled and crashed.

The AAIC determined that the following factors, as a chain or a combination thereof, caused the accident:

* The F/O inadvertently triggered the Go lever. It is considered that the design of the GO lever contributed to it: normal operation of the thrust lever allows the possibility of an inadvertent triggering of the GO lever.

* The crew engaged the APs while GO AROUND mode was still engaged, and continued approach.

* The F/O continued pushing the control wheel in accordance with the CAP's instructions, despite its strong resistive force, in order to continue the approach.

* The movement of the THS conflicted with that of the elevators, causing an abnormal out-of-trim situation.

* There was no warning and recognition function to alert the crew directly and actively to the onset of the abnormal out-of-trim condition.

* The CAP and F/O did not sufficiently understand the FD mode change and the AP override function.

It is considered that unclear descriptions of the AFS (Automatic Flight System) in the FCOM (Flight Crew Operating Manual) prepared by the aircraft manufacturer contributed to this.

* The CAP's judgment of the flight situation while continuing approach was inadequate, control take-over was delayed, and appropriate actions were not taken.

* The Alpha-Floor function was activated; this was incompatible with the abnormal out-of-trim situation, and generated a large pitch-up moment. This narrowed the range of selection for recovery operations and reduced the time allowance for such operations.

* The CAP's and F/O's awareness of the flight conditions, after the PlC took over the controls and during their recovery operation, was inadequate respectively.

* Crew coordination between the CAP and the F/O was inadequate.

* The modification prescribed in Service Bulletin SB A300-22-602 1 had not been incorporated into the aircraft.

* The aircraft manufacturer did not categorise the SB A300-22-6021 as "Mandatory", which would have given it the highest priority. The airworthiness authority of the nation of design and manufacture did not issue promptly an airworthiness directive pertaining to implementation of the above SB.