We start the week with the following stories...
Of note, a message and request from Chief Goldfeder's "The Secret List" asking for everyone to reach out to your members of Congress today and ask them to support the inclusion of the "Honoring Our Fallen Heroes Act" in the final version of the National Defense Authorization Act. This is critical legislation that will help support the families of our nation’s firefighters.
WHY? Because every Firefighter knows a Firefighter with cancer. Your immediate action helps them, their families, and may help you and your family in the future ...
Keep reading in the full letter from "The Secret List":
Here are the stories...
Be safe out there!
Tom
-
For Every Firefighter: ACTION Requested (The Secret List)
All,
Your (as well as your friends' and family
members') immediate help is needed.
Last January 23, Senator Amy Klobuchar (MN) and Senator Kevin Cramer (ND) introduced S. 237, the Honoring Our Fallen Heroes Act. The legislation expands the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits (PSOB) program to Line of Duty Death and permanent disabilities that occur because of certain occupational cancers. On February 12, Congresswoman Mary Gay Scanlon (PA-5) introduced companion legislation, H.R. 1269.
WHY?
Every Firefighter knows a Firefighter with cancer. Your immediate action helps them, their families, and may help you and your family in the future ... keep reading:
The PSOB program provides benefits to the survivors of public safety officers who die in the line of duty, as well as disability benefits to officers who become permanently disabled due to injuries sustained in the line of duty. The legislation was included as part of the Senate-passed annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The House and Senate are now resolving differences between the two chambers' versions of the NDAA, and IAFF, NFFF, and other national fire service organizations are advocating for the inclusion of S. 237.
A QUICK BUT IMPORTANT REQUEST:
Please reach out to your members of Congress today (access and sample message below) and ask them to support the inclusion of the Honoring Our Fallen Heroes Act in the final version of the NDAA. This is critical legislation that will help support the families of our nation’s firefighters.
Visit this link to contact your members of Congress:
https://www.congress.gov/members/find-your-member.
(SEE SAMPLE MESSAGE BELOW for your consideration)
WE KNOW:
Every Firefighter knows a Firefighter with cancer. This helps them, their families, and may help you and your family in the future.
Take Care. Be Careful. Pass It On.
BillyG
The Secret List 11/24/2025-0800 Hours
*****SAMPLE MESSAGE*****
On behalf of firefighters and their families in our community, I urge you to retain Section 1098 of the Senate’s NDAA - the Honoring Our Fallen Heroes Act (H.R. 1269/S. 237) - in the final FY 2026 NDAA. This section extends survivor benefits to the families of first responders lost to job-related cancer.
Numerous medical studies have shown cancer to be the leading cause of death for firefighters. However, the Public Safety Officers Benefits (PSOB) program does not recognize occupational cancer as an eligible cause of death because it cannot be definitively linked to a single, specific emergency response. This connection between firefighting and cancer is clear, but identifying the single emergency incident that caused the cancer is an impossible standard. Like the issues surrounding burn pit exposures for military service members, this technical error forces first responders’ survivors to struggle by denying them critically needed benefits.
Section 1098 of the Senate NDAA corrects this oversight and ensures first responders lost to job-related cancer will not be forgotten. This section is based on H.R. 1269/S. 237, which was moved unanimously through the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate. This bipartisan, commonsense provision must be retained in the final NDAA.
Please keep fighting for firefighters and keep Section 1098 (S. 237) in the final NDAA. I urge you also to cosponsor H.R. 1269 if you have not already done so.
The plane returned to Okęcie Airport due to smoke. "The phone caught fire."
TVM24
A flight from Warsaw to Istanbul was forced to
turn back Friday evening due to smoke on board. The cause was a battery failure on a passenger's phone. A spokesperson for LOT Polish Airlines told us that the crew brought the situation under control using a fire extinguisher. The device was then recovered by firefighters at the airport.
The plane took off from Chopin Airport on Friday, a few minutes before 8 p.m. It was scheduled to arrive in Istanbul, Turkey. Flight records from flightradar24.pl show that the plane turned back to Warsaw near Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski.
The reasons for this situation were explained by LOT Polish Airlines spokesman Krzysztof Moczulski.
"There was smoke on board caused by a battery failure in an electronic device belonging to one of the passengers. The crew, in accordance with procedure, used a fire extinguisher and neutralized the smoke," Moczulski said. He explained that the device was then placed in a container with a large amount of water to cool it.
The spokesman added that a decision was made to return to Warsaw, where the landing took place as normal.
None of the passengers or crew were hurt.
"The phone caught fire"
One of the passengers on the Istanbul flight shared the details of the incident. "When the phone caught fire, the crew quickly began extinguishing it. The captain then decided to return to Warsaw due to the potential danger and the exhaustion of fire extinguishing agents," Paweł Kazało reported.
He described how the plane landed in Warsaw without incident and then taxied to a location where two fire trucks were waiting. "After stopping, the firefighters boarded the plane and took the container containing the phone from the crew. We were asked to remain in our seats until the police arrived. About 40 minutes after landing, we were taken to the terminal," the man explained.
- The entire situation was handled by the crew very professionally - he emphasized.
The fire brigade intervened
As we've learned, the Airport Rescue and Firefighting Service responded to the scene. Support from the city fire department was also called.
Senior Captain Wojciech Kapczyński from the Municipal Headquarters of the State Fire Service in Warsaw reported that some units were turned back while they were on their way to the airport, while others were recalled after arriving at the gathering point.
After the emergency services had concluded their operations, the passengers later continued their journey to Turkey on board another plane.
Power bank catches fire on Scoot flight from Hong Kong, extinguished by cabin crew
Jeremy Lee
Scoot says no injuries reported after power bank catches fire on plane
A passenger said a power bank caught fire on a Scoot flight from Hong Kong, and cabin crew extinguished it.
In a video posted by the XiaoHongShu user, viewers could see the Scoot cabin crew putting an item inside a plastic bag on the floor.
‘Strong burning smell’ detected on Scoot flight
The netizen said the incident happened on a Scoot flight from Hong Kong to Singapore last Saturday (22 Nov).
As the plane was about to land, she detected a “strong burning smell” and thought that a laptop somewhere in front had “spontaneously combusted”.
Cabin crew took a long time to put out the fire using a fire extinguisher and water, she added.
After the plane landed, firefighters and medics boarded to assess whether everything was alright before passengers disembarked.
Cabin wall burnt by fire
Commenting on her post, another passenger shared a photo of a burn mark on the cabin wall.
She had seen this as she disembarked, she said.
Netizens described it as “scary” as it appeared that the fire had burnt through the plane’s body, but others said that was impossible as the plane would have lost pressure.
Cabin crew seen dragging laptop bag into toilet
Speaking to The Straits Times (ST), the user who posted the video said she saw flight attendants rushing to get protective gloves, ice and a fire extinguisher.
They dragged a black laptop bag into the toilet, instructing passengers to remain seated and refrain from taking photos or videos, the 28-year-old woman added.
Passengers were informed of the fire only after the plane landed, causing “some panic” and discomfort due to the smell of smoke and chemicals.
From the burn marks on the cabin wall, she believed someone stowed the bag under a seat.
Overheated power bank caused ‘small flame’: Scoot
In a statement, Scoot told ST that the fire occurred on flight TR939 from Hong Kong to Singapore.
The airline confirmed that an overheated power bank caused the “small flame” in the cabin.
Cabin crew promptly extinguished it, with no injuries reported.
When the plane landed uneventfully in Singapore at 9.06pm on 22 Nov, airport emergency services were on standby, with all passengers and crew disembarking normally.
Scoot apologised for the disruption and inconvenience caused, saying that its top priority remained the safety of customers and crew.
Use of power banks banned on board Scoot since 1 April
The incident follows a slew of recent in-flight fires, most of which were suspected to be caused by power banks.
Last month, an Air China flight was forced to make an emergency landing after a lithium battery burst into flames inside an overhead compartment.
In March, a Hong Kong Airlines plane was similarly forced to land after a power bank on board allegedly caught fire.
Scoot and sister airline Singapore Airlines have banned the use of power banks on board since 1 April, with charging via the onboard USB ports also prohibited.
Other airlines, including AirAsia and Thai Airways, have also banned the use of power banks following a string of fires.
NTSB Final Report: BAE 146 Series 200A (A1); DC-9-87 (A2)
Post-Season Maintenance On The Two Airplanes Involved Found Significant Evidence Of Corrosion On The Internal Tank Structure
Location: Missoula, Montana Incident Number: ENG24LA012
Date & Time: March 1, 2024, 09:00 Local Registration: N474NA (A1); N296EA (A2)
Aircraft: British Aerospace BAE 146 Series 200A (A1); McDonnell Douglas DC-9-87 (A2)
Aircraft Damage: Minor (A1); Minor (A2) Defining Event: Miscellaneous/other Injuries: N/A (A1); N/A (A2)
Flight Conducted Under: Public aircraft (A1); Public aircraft (A2)
Analysis: The United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS) had been using long term fire retardants (LTFRs) for many decades with no significant corrosion issues noted on their contract aircraft. Since at least 2006, the USFS had a single source supplier for LTFRs that provided retardants with monoammonium phosphate (MAP), diammonium phosphate (DAP),
and/or ammonium polyphosphate (APP) used as the retardant salt. Beginning in 2020, the USFS allowed LTFRs to be submitted for qualification that contained retardant salts different from the historic phosphate-based retardants. The USFS granted conditional qualification to Fortress FR-100, a magnesium chloride-based (MgCl) dry powder concentrate, and Fortress FR-200, a MgCl-based liquid powder concentrate in May 2021 and August 2021, respectively, after they successfully completed uniform corrosion testing in accordance with USFS Specification 5100-304d, Long-Term Retardant, Wildland Firefighting at the USFS National Technology and Development Program (NTDP). The specified corrosion testing, which only examined the corrosive effects of a single retardant on one aluminum alloy, one steel alloy, one brass alloy, and one magnesium alloy, had been unchanged for many years.
Beginning in June 2021, the first operational field evaluation (OFE) of FR-100 (MgCl-based) retardant began to show there was an incompatibility between MgCl-based and phosphatebased retardants when they were comingled in service. Increased corrosion was present on some aircraft components, and subsequent laboratory testing by NTDP confirmed the incompatibility between certain retardants. Test reports, USFS documents, and information received from operators and vendors suggested that the use of any new retardant should be delayed until further corrosion testing, more appropriate comingling studies, and updated operational procedures were completed. Additional testing by NTDP completed in July 2023 showed that alternating between phosphate-based and MgCl based retardants caused significant residue buildup in the level sensors used in the retardant tanks. Despite the evidence of incompatibilities between the retardants and without performing additional corrosion testing, the USFS decided to initiate an integration operational field evaluation (IOFE) during the 2023 fire season with two large air tankers using Fortress FR-200 (MgClbased) and Perimeter Solutions MVP-Fx (MAP and DAP-based) retardants. During the first part of the season both airtankers carried only FR-200 retardant then both airtankers alternated between FR-200 and MVP-Fx retardants for the second part of the season.
At the conclusion of the 2023 fire season, post-season maintenance on the two airplanes involved found significant evidence of corrosion on the internal tank structure and components as well as the external airplane structure. Several items from each airplane were examined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lab under the direction of the investigation. For some of the items, NIST concluded that there was galvanic corrosion occurring where the steel and aluminum alloy components were coupled electrically in the presence of liquid retardants. For other items, NIST concluded that the corrosion was the result of a breakdown in material surface protection treatments in the presence of the liquid or dried retardants. NIST also examined the chemical interaction of the retardants and concluded that there is a likely interaction related to the nitrogen-based proprietary corrosion inhibitors present in the different retardants.
Preliminary studies by NTDP based on the investigation findings validated the galvanic corrosion action between certain steel and aluminum alloys in the presence of a single liquid retardant, either FR-200 or MVP-Fx. NTDP also performed additional studies at the request of the investigation examining the galvanic corrosion action in comingled retardants that showed the comingled products resulted in more severe corrosion on certain alloys. The more severe galvanic corrosion in comingled retardants is likely due to the more acidic mixture that results from comingling. NTDP has initiated several corrosion studies to further examine corrosive mechanisms on additional alloys and built-up structures in the presence of LTFRs.
Probable Cause and Findings: The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident to be -- The use of a new long term fire retardant with a chemical composition incompatible with the retardant previously in use for the integration-operational field evaluation without adequate testing and qualification.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
NTSB Final Report: Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna P2012 Traveller
Airplane Lunged Forward When It Was Stuck From Behind By A Tug That Was Towing An Unoccupied Airliner
Location: Boston, Massachusetts Accident Number: ERA25LA060
Date & Time: November 25, 2024, 18:26 Local Registration: N651CA
Aircraft: Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecna P2012 Traveller Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Ground collision Injuries: 2 Minor, 3 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Scheduled
Analysis: At the conclusion of the air taxi flight, the flight crew were taxiing the small twin-engine airplane to their assigned gate at night. The crew were holding short of the gate area and awaiting clearance to enter. After holding for about 10 minutes with the airplane’s parking brake set, the flight crew heard a loud noise and the airplane lunged forward when it was stuck from behind by a tug that was towing an unoccupied airliner. The small airplane sustained substantial damage to its elevator and horizontal stabilizer. The tug’s windshield was damaged during the collision, and the airliner was not damaged.
Surveillance video showed that the tug’s headlights were operating as it drove straight along the taxiway toward the small airplane. The small airplane’s wing and tail navigational light were also visible and operating. As the tug approached the rear of the airplane, its headlights brightened, and its speed abruptly slowed just prior to the impact with the airplane’s elevator.
According to the company who operated the tug, following the accident, the driver and safety observer in the tug initially reported that its brakes had “failed” but later described that the brakes were not operating as expected. The tug crew also reported that an “oversteer alarm” had been sounding continuously during their operation of the tug, and that they had reported this to a supervisor prior to initiating the tow of the airliner. They were instructed to complete the tow, after which maintenance personnel would evaluate the reason for the alarm. Following the accident, maintenance personnel performed an operational check of the tug’s brakes and noted no anomalies. Further examination revealed that the oversteer alarm was due to a malfunction in the tug’s monitoring system.
Given this information it is likely that the tug crew saw the small airplane, but their visual lookout was not sufficient to identify it with sufficient time/distance to stop. While the tug was being operated with an active alarm, this should not have impacted the tug crew’s ability to stop the tug while driving straight on a taxiway.
Probable Cause and Findings: The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be -- The tug crew’s inadequate visual lookout while towing an airplane at night and their failure to identify a stationary airplane within sufficient time/distance to stop.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
NTSB Final Report: Glasair GlaStar
Smoke Began Entering The Cockpit During The Landing Flare, And Then The Pilot Noticed Flames On The Right Side Of The Airplane
Location: Hearne, Texas Accident Number: CEN25LA352
Date & Time: August 28, 2025, 18:00 Local Registration: N605MN
Aircraft: Glasair GlaStar Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Fire/smoke (non-impact) Injuries: 1 Minor
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
Analysis: The pilot reported that about 30 minutes into the local flight, he heard some crackling in the radio reception and then the cockpit flight displays went blank. The engine stumbled and lost power completely. The pilot was operating the airplane in the airport traffic pattern at that time and decided to secure the engine to set up for a forced landing to the runway. Smoke began entering the cockpit during the landing flare, and then the pilot noticed flames on the right side of the airplane. After he stopped the airplane, he exited, obtained a fire extinguisher, and called the fire department. The airplane sustained substantial fire damage to the fuselage, empennage, and engine mounts.
A postaccident examination revealed extensive thermal damage to the engine and within the engine compartment. The damage extended into the cockpit and cabin area, and then along the right side to the aft fuselage. While clear that the fire started within the engine compartment, the extent of the damage prevented a determination of the exact location and source of the fire.
Probable Cause and Findings: The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be -- The inflight engine compartment fire for reasons that could not be determined.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
Today in History
24 Years ago today: On 24 November 2001 Crossair flight 3597, an Avro RJ100, crashed while on approach to Zürich-Kloten Airport, Switzerland, killing 24 occupants; 9 survived the accident.
| Date: | Saturday 24 November 2001 |
| Time: | 22:06 |
| Type: | Avro RJ100 |
| Owner/operator: | Crossair |
| Registration: | HB-IXM |
| MSN: | E3291 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1996 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 13194 hours |
| Cycles: | 11518 flights |
| Engine model: | Lycoming LF507-1F |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 24 / Occupants: 33 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | 4 km E of Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH) - Switzerland |
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | EDDT |
| Destination airport: | Zürich-Kloten Airport (ZRH/LSZH) |
| Investigating agency: | BFU Switz. |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:
Crossair flight 3597, an Avro RJ100, crashed while on approach to Zürich-Kloten Airport, Switzerland, killing 24 occupants; 9 survived the accident.
Flight LX3597 departed Berlin-Tegel at 21:01 from runway 26L for a flight to Zürich. The Avro climbed to a cruising altitude of FL270. At 21:40 the crew were cleared to descend to FL240 and two minutes later further down to FL160. At that time the crew were carrying out an approach briefing for a runway 14 ILS approach at Zürich. Having been further cleared down to FL130, the crew were told to prepare for a runway 28 VOR/DME approach. Another approach briefing was carried out and the minimum descent altitude was found to be 2390 feet AMSL. At 21:58 the aircraft was cleared for the runway 28 approach.
At 22:03 the aircraft was descending to 4000 feet after which it turned right for the final approach to runway 28. At 22:04 a preceding aircraft reported having the runway in sight at 2.2DME. At about 22:05 the captain reported reaching the minimum descent altitude and said that he could see the ground. A little later the radio altimeter reported 500 feet agl, followed by a "minimum" warning. The captain then ordered a go around, but this was too late. The aircraft struck trees and crashed. The treetops were at 1784 feet AMSL.
On October 18, a treaty was signed between Switzerland and Germany a.o. regarding the use of German airspace for Zurich approaches at certain times of the day. After 10 p.m., incoming aircraft had to approach Zurich from the east to land on runway 28. While the other runways have ILS equipment, runway 28 only allows VOR/DME approaches. Over a two week period (9-22 November) 108 approaches were carried out on runway - 2,3% of the total number of landings for that period.
CAUSES: "The accident is attributable to the fact that on the final approach, in own navigation, of the standard VOR/DME approach 28 the aircraft flew controlled into a wooded range of hills (controlled flight into terrain - CFIT), because the flight crew deliberately continued the descent under instrument flight conditions below the minimum altitude for the approach without having the necessary prerequisites. The flight crew initiated the go around too late. The investigation has determined the following causal factors in relation to the accident:
- The commander deliberately descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of the standard VOR/DME approach 28 without having the required visual contact to the approach lights or the runway
- The copilot made no attempt to prevent the continuation of the flight below the minimum descent altitude.
The following factors contributed to the accident:
- In the approach sector of runway 28 at Zurich airport there was no system available which triggers an alarm if a minimum safe altitude is violated (minimum safe altitude warning - MSAW).
- Over a long period of time, the responsible persons of the airline did not make correct assessments of the commanderÂ’s flying performance. Where weaknesses were perceptable, they did not take appropriate measures. The commanderÂ’s ability to concentrate and take appropriate decisions as well as his ability to analyse complex processes were adversely affected by fatigue.
- Task-sharing between the flight crew during the approach was not appropriate and did not correspond to the required procedures by the airline.
- The range of hills which the aircraft came into contact with was not marked on the approach chart used by the flight crew.
- The means of determining the meteorological visibility at the airport was not representative for the approach sector runway 28, because it did not correspond to the actual visibility.
- The valid visual minimums at the time of the accident were inappropriate for a decision to use the standard VOR/DME approach 28."
