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Quick action by firefighters and technical factors prevented an explosion after a plane crash in Belo Horizonte, according to experts and authorities.
Firefighters carried out preventative procedures against combustion. According to experts, there was probably no combination of fuel, oxygen, and ignition source necessary for an explosion to occur.
By Rodrigo Salgado , g1 Minas — Belo Horizonte
The crash of a single-engine plane that hit a building in the Silveira neighborhood, in the Northeast region of Belo Horizonte , mobilized teams from the Fire Department and raised concerns about the risk of explosion, since the aircraft was fueled with aviation gasoline, which is highly flammable. 
According to experts and authorities, the combination of technical factors and the immediate response of emergency teams were decisive in preventing a large-scale fire .
Two people died at the scene of the accident , and a third victim died hours later in the hospital. The other two occupants were hospitalized in serious condition and were stable on Monday night.
The report explains why there was no explosion and how the accident occurred, based on the points below:
- Isolation of the area and inerting.
- No elements for combustion
- Cenipa will conduct an investigation.
- The accident
Isolation of the area and inerting.
Immediately after the accident, the Fire Department isolated the area and called in a team specializing in chemicals and hazardous materials.
“We adopted the measure of bringing in a specialized team to the scene to properly inert [see below] this combustible material with foam-generating liquid, which prevents combustion or worsening of the scene in the event of an explosion,” explained Major Johny Franco, commander of the 3rd Battalion of the Fire Department of Belo Horizonte .
Inerting is the addition of an inert gas (such as nitrogen or CO₂) to reduce the possibility of fire by decreasing the contact of the fuel with oxygen, which is necessary for combustion.
No elements for combustion
In addition to safety measures, aeronautical experts point out that for an explosion to occur, fuel, oxygen, and an ignition source must be present simultaneously and in a proportion that allows combustion . This did not happen.
"Probably, these three factors didn't align for combustion to occur. It could be just a spark, but fuel, oxygen, and ignition need to be present in the correct proportion, which is not common in accidents," explained Elizeu Alcântara, professor of aeronautics at Fumec University.
The aircraft involved was an EMB-721C “Sertanejo” , manufactured by Neiva, with a capacity of approximately
291 liters of aviation gasoline. The tanks are integrated into the wings, a common configuration in this type of aircraft to maintain balance during flight.
The plane took off from Pampulha Airport at 12:16 PM and crashed shortly after, at 12:19 PM, hitting a residential building. Five people were on board. The pilot and one passenger died instantly, and three others were rescued in serious condition. The third victim died at the hospital.
Cenipa will conduct an investigation.
The Civil Police reported that they conducted the initial investigations at the scene.
"The forensics team collected photos and videos, and now we await the technical investigation from Cenipa [Center for Investigation and Prevention of Aeronautical Accidents, linked to the Air Force], which is the body responsible for investigating air accidents," stated Delegate Andreia Pormann.
Despite the impact, no residents of the building were injured. Everyone was safely evacuated by the Fire Department. The plane collided with the building in the stairwell and did not damage any apartments.
The accident
A small, single-engine plane crashed into a building on Rua Ilacir Pereira Lima, in the Silveira neighborhood, in the Northeast Region of Belo Horizonte . The aircraft departed from Teófilo Otoni, landed at Pampulha Airport, took off again towards São Paulo, and crashed three minutes later.
Five people were on board the aircraft at the time of the accident ; the pilot and one passenger died instantly. The other three people were taken to João XXIII Hospital in serious condition, and one of them died hours later.
TV Globo has learned that the following people were on board the plane at the time of the accident:
- Wellington Oliveira, a 34-year-old pilot, did not survive his injuries and died instantly.
- Fernando Moreira Souto, son of the mayor of the city of Jequitinhonha (MG), 36 years old. He was in the passenger seat and also died at the scene;
- Leonardo Berganholi, a 50-year-old businessman, died hours later in the hospital.
- Arthur Schaper Berganholi, Leonardo's 25-year-old son, was hospitalized in serious condition, but his health was stable on Monday night.
- Hemerson Cleiton Almeida Souto, 53 years old. He was hospitalized in serious condition, but his health was stable on Monday night.
DFW and Love Field adding transponders to fire trucks to prevent runway collisions
Fire trucks at both Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport and Dallas Love Field do not currently have location transponders, but they are coming, NBC 5 Investigates has learned.
By Scott Friedman and Eva Parks
Fire trucks at DFW Airport and Dallas Love Field currently lack transponders that the NTSB says may have helped prevent a deadly collision between a plane and a fire truck in New York in March.
After a deadly runway collision in New York, where a plane
hit a fire truck, NBC 5 Investigates examined whether North Texas airports have the technology needed to prevent something similar from happening here.
NBC 5 Investigates found that fire trucks at both Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport and Dallas Love Field do not currently have location transponders — technology the National Transportation Safety Board said may have helped prevent the New York crash.
A DFW Airport spokesperson told NBC 5 Investigates the airport’s fire trucks are expected to get location transponders later this year. A Love Field spokesperson said that the airport is actively preparing to launch its transponder program in the coming months.
The issue has taken on new urgency following a new NTSB report on the runway collision at New York’s LaGuardia Airport in March.
Investigators said an air traffic controller cleared a fire truck to cross the runway just seconds before a plane touched down. That happened even though LaGuardia is equipped with a highly advanced runway collision detection system known as ASDE‑X, which uses ground radar to help controllers track aircraft and vehicles near runways.
But the NTSB said the radar could only intermittently track the fire truck involved in the crash because multiple vehicles were near the runway, and none were equipped with transponders that send precise location and direction data.
The report said, “Without transponder‑equipped vehicles…the system was unable to correlate the track of the airplane with the track of Truck 1…and did not predict a potential conflict with the landing airplane.”
DFW Airport is equipped with an ASDE‑X system similar to LaGuardia. And like the New York airport, a DFW spokesperson told NBC 5 Investigates that its fire trucks do not currently have location transponders. The airport said they are expected later this year.
DFW said its fire trucks have an onboard warning system that alerts the driver to potential runway hazards.
Dallas Love Field does not have ASDE‑X, but the airport recently upgraded to a different FAA‑supported runway monitoring system known as the Surface Awareness Initiative, or SAI.
According to the FAA, SAI is designed to enhance runway safety by allowing air traffic controllers to see the location of aircraft and ground vehicles on their displays, but only vehicles equipped with transponders are visible in the system.
A Love Field spokesperson told NBC 5 Investigates that none of the airport’s fire trucks currently have those transponders. The spokesperson said Love Field will begin installing transponders in the months ahead, though the airport did not provide a more specific timeline.
In the meantime, Love Field said its fire trucks are equipped with smart tablets that show the driver nearby air traffic locations in real time.
The FAA has strongly encouraged airports to equip all ground vehicles with transponders and has a program to help airports pay for that equipment. Transponders typically cost about $ 3,000 per unit.
Former NTSB investigator Jeff Guzzetti said the New York crash investigation shines an important light on the issue of how to prevent vehicles from straying into the path of a plane.
"I think there's going to be some questions about training and equipage of these vehicles, these ground vehicles, the fire trucks. How are they trained? What types of transmitters do they have inside of them to help controllers?” Guzzetti told NBC 5 Investigates.
FAA data shows that since 2023, DFW has had 45 runway incursions where a vehicle or another aircraft crossed into a plane’s path. Three of those happened last year.
At Love Field, there have been 15 incursions since 2023, seven of them happened in 2025.
The FAA says all of the incidents at DFW and Love Field were considered low-severity, with enough time or distance to avoid a collision.
https://www.nbcdfw.com/investigations/dfw-and-love-field-adding-transponders-to-prevent-runway-collisions/4020101/
NTSB Prelim: Girardeau Samuel G Sonex-A
While Returning To The Airport, At About 2,500 Ft Altitude, The Engine Began To Sputter
Location: Martinsburg, WV Accident Number: ERA26LA162
Date & Time: April 4, 2026, 13:39 Local Registration: N106D
Aircraft: Girardeau Samuel G Sonex-A Injuries: 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
On April 4, 2026, about 1339 eastern daylight time, a Girardeau Samuel G Sonex-A airplane, N106D, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Martinsburg, WV. The pilot and passenger were not injured. The aircraft was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot reported that 7 to 8 minutes after takeoff from Eastern WV Regional Airport (MRB), the engine exhaust gas temperatures (EGT) began to rise, while operating with a full rich mixture. When the EGTs continued to increase, he elected to return to the airport. Shortly thereafter, while returning to the airport, at about 2,500 ft altitude, the engine began to sputter and experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot declared an emergency with air traffic control. Unable to reach the airport, he conducted an emergency landing to an open field. After touchdown, he was unable to stop the airplane and subsequently impacted a fence and crossed a road before coming to rest against another fence. A metal fence post pierced the fuselage which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage.
The wreckage was retained for further examination.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
Today in History
7 Years ago today: On 5 May 2019 Aeroflot flight 1492, a Sukhoi Superjet, returned to land at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport in Russia and burst into flames during an attempted emergency landing. Of the 78 persons on board, 41 did not survive.
| Date: | Sunday 5 May 2019 |
| Time: | 18:30 |
| Type: | Sukhoi Superjet 100-95B |
| Owner/operator: | Aeroflot Russian International Airlines |
| Registration: | RA-89098 |
| MSN: | 95135 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2017 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 2710 hours |
| Cycles: | 1658 flights |
| Engine model: | PowerJet SaM146 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 41 / Occupants: 78 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Moskva-Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO) - Russia |
| Phase: | Landing |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Moskva-Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO/UUEE) |
| Destination airport: | Murmansk Airport (MMK/ULMM) |
| Investigating agency: | MAK |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:
Aeroflot flight 1492, a Sukhoi Superjet, returned to land at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport in Russia and burst into flames during an attempted emergency landing. Of the 78 persons on board, 41 did not survive.
The aircraft took off from Sheremetyevo Airport's runway 24C at 18:03 hours local time on a scheduled service to Murmansk, Russia. Visibility was fine but there were some Cumulonimbus clouds near the airfield at 6000 feet.
The flight crew engaged the autopilot as the aircraft climbed through a height of 700 ft (215 m). At 18:08, as the aircraft was climbing through an altitude of about 8900 ft (2700 m), a failure occurred in the electrical system. At this point, the aircraft was 30 km west-northwest of the airport in an area of thunderstorm activity.
The captain assumed manual control of the aircraft and the crew managed to establish radio contact using UHF. The flight was not able to contact the approach controller and subsequently selected the emergency transponder code 7600 (loss of radio communication).
About 18:17 the aircraft overshot the runway centreline after turning to runway heading. Altitude at that time was about 2400 feet. The aircraft continued the right-hand turn, completed a circle and proceeded on the final approach for runway 24L. Flaps were selected at 25°, which was the recommended setting for landing above maximum landing weight.
At 18:26 the flight crew selected the emergency transponder code 7700 (emergency).
When descending from 335 to 275 m (1100-900 ft) the windshear warning system sounded five times: "Go around. Windshear ahead".
From a height of 80 m (260 ft) above ground level, the aircraft descended below the glide path and at a height of 55 m (180 ft) the TAWS warning sounded: "Glide Slope." From that moment on the airspeed increased to 170 knots.
At 18:30 the aircraft overflew the runway threshold and touched down at a distance of 900 m past the threshold at a speed of 158 knots. Touchdown occurred at a g-force of at least 2.55g with a subsequent bounce to a height of about 2 m. After two seconds the aircraft landed again on the nose landing gear with a vertical load 5.85g, and bounced to a height of 6 m. The third landing of the aircraft occurred at a speed of 140 knots with a vertical overload of at least 5g. This caused a rupture of the wing structure and fuel lines. Flames erupted and engulfed the rear of the aircraft. The aircraft slid to a stop on the grass between runway 24L and two taxiways. An emergency evacuation was then carried out while flames quickly engulfed the rear fuselage.
Conclusion
The cause of the aviation accident involving the RRJ-95B
aircraft (registration RA-89098) was the uncoordinated control inputs by the captain during the flare phase of landing and during the repeated bounces of the aircraft off the runway (“porpoising�), which were characterized by multiple, disproportionate, alternating movements of the control stick, with it being held at extreme positions. These control actions led to three hard landings, and during the second and third landings, the absorbed energy levels significantly exceeded the maximum values considered during the aircraft type certification strength assessment. This resulted in the destruction of structural load-bearing elements of the airframe, rupture of fuel tanks with fuel spillage, and the outbreak of a fire.
Contributing factors included:
- Ineffectiveness of the approved pilot training programs for the RRJ-95 in handling special (complex) situations when the flight control system (FCS) switched to 'DIRECT MODE', leading to insufficient knowledge and skills of the crew to operate the aircraft in this mode. While the training programs met the minimum requirements of the Federal Aviation Rules (FAR), they did not address the specifics of such a situation.
- Ineffectiveness of the airline's flight operations quality assurance (FOQA) system in ensuring pilots developed stable piloting skills. This failed to identify and correct the captain’s systematic errors in longitudinal control using the side-stick during landing, including pushing the side-stick forward beyond the neutral position during flare.
- Failure to detect deviations (hazard factors) in piloting techniques in previous instances of FCS transitions to DIRECT MODE, and hence, no preventive measures were taken.
- Vague language in the aircraft's operational documentation regarding piloting techniques during flare and correction of deviations during landing (e.g., bounce handling).
- Non-compliance by the crew with FAR and Flight Operations Manual (FOM) requirements during flight preparation and execution, despite forecasted and observed thunderstorm activity and the presence of such weather zones on the weather radar. This led to the aircraft being struck by atmospheric electricity, causing data concentrator reboots and the FCS switching to DIRECT MODE. The FCS switch to DIRECT MODE due to lightning or static electricity was considered a “complex situation� during certification and complies with certification requirements.
- Significant increase in the captain’s psycho-emotional stress after the lightning strike and his prolonged inability to maintain acceptable flight precision in DIRECT MODE, leading to a psychological fixation on making an “urgent� landing and an unwillingness to perform a go-around.
- Personal psychological traits of the crew members affecting their behavior under stress, along with insufficient training of the captain in human factors and threat/error management. This prevented him from objectively assessing his mental state and ability to control the aircraft, choosing the best flight continuation strategy, and managing crew coordination and resource management effectively.
- The captain’s inability to manually trim the aircraft in the longitudinal axis, including during glide path descent.
- Incorrect crew assessment of a predictive wind shear alert (GO AROUND, W/S AHEAD) while on final approach, resulting in a failure to initiate a go-around. This led to encountering a microburst after the flare began, affecting the aircraft’s trajectory. Aircraft and airline documentation allow ignoring this alert if the crew is convinced there is “no wind shear threat,� but there are no clear criteria for this in operational documents or the FOM.
- The captain’s intentional descent below the glide path during the final approach (after passing decision height).
- Discrepancies between the airline’s FOM and the aircraft manufacturer’s documentation regarding actions to take when deviation from the glide path occurs. If the manufacturer's instructions had been followed, a go-around would have been required. The airline unjustifiably widened the stabilization criteria for approach, particularly regarding allowable speed deviations. The actual indicated airspeed exceeded the target by more than 15 knots, and in DIRECT MODE, this caused an unexpectedly strong pitch response to side-stick input.
- The crew’s failure to follow the standard procedure for manual deployment of air brakes during landing. The vague wording in the documentation and the configuration logic requiring pre-arming of air brakes for automatic deployment — even though automation is not available in DIRECT MODE — reduced crew situational awareness.
- Activation of reverse thrust after the first bounce, which made it impossible to perform a subsequent go-around.
According to forensic medical examinations, the cause of death for 40 out of 41 victims was exposure to open flame, accompanied by burns to the upper respiratory tract due to inhalation of hot air.
The fire began after the aircraft’s third impact with the
runway due to the destruction of wing fuel tanks and fuel spillage. Fuel leaked both from the landing gear actuator mount areas and other wing sections. The landing gear was damaged during the second landing, and by the third impact, it was operating beyond design limits and couldn’t properly absorb landing loads.
The collapse (failure) of the "weak links" in the landing gear during the second landing functioned as designed. The actual loads experienced were below those used to demonstrate compliance with section 25.721 of FAR-25 during certification, which meant that the main gear was only partially separated from the airframe — only the “weak link� elements at point “A� were destroyed.
There is a lack of correlation between certification requirements for structural strength — including the main landing gear supports — and those for demonstrating safe separation, which results in substantial risk of fuel tank rupture and fuel leakage even when meeting both sets of requirements separately.
At the onset, the fire was a deflagration flash, accompanied by intense smoke, and transitioned to sustained burning within two seconds. By the time passenger evacuation began, the fire had already penetrated the cabin through several windows in the aft fuselage on both sides. Airworthiness standards do not require windows to provide fire resistance from external sources. The situation exceeded expected operational conditions due to the absence of the standard 90-second window used to demonstrate evacuation capability during certification.
Factors most likely contributing to the severity of the consequences included:
- Engines still operating, not shut down promptly by the crew;
- Large volume of fuel leaking from both wing consoles, entering the area of the engine exhaust nozzles and exposed to jet blast;
- Inability to use both rear exits for evacuation;
- “Flashover� effect in the rear of the cabin;
- Passenger stampede and panic;
- Some passengers attempting to retrieve hand luggage during evacuation;
- Error by the lead flight attendant in using the public address system, resulting in reduced passenger awareness about the evacuation process.
A fire development model by the St. Petersburg University of the State Fire Service of the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM) showed that the flight attendant's mistaken decision to open the rear left door under the actual circumstances did not increase the fire’s damaging effects and did not influence the severity of the accident's consequences.
