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Airplane Crash Lands In Riverside County, Firefighters Handle Leaking Fuel
Emergency responders rushed to the field where a small aircraft made an emergency landing.
By Ashley Ludwig, Patch Staff
LAKE MATHEWS, CA — A small aircraft crash-landed near Unincorporated Riverside County Wednesday morning, Cal Fire/Riverside County shared. 
Shortly before 11:30 a.m., the craft was downed in the 15100 block of Lake Mathews Drive, Cal Fire spokesperson Maggie Cline De La Rosa said.
According to an FAA spokesperson, the plane, a Cessna 177, had two people on board.
There were no injuries in the crash, and the occupants were both able to exit the plane without assistance, she said.
Battalion Chief Josh Rivers spoke on the aircraft emergency. "The single-engine Cessna incident is being investigated by the Riverside County Sheriff and the FAA," he said.
There was a small fuel leak, and the crews were able to mitigate the 20 gallons of fuel from causing further damage, she said.
Riverside County Sheriff's officers were also at the scene, as witnessed by multiple people. The FAA will investigate the cause of the crash.
Though the 1973 Cessna's owners declined to share flight details, FAA records show that the plane is owned by a corporation and registered to Pride Electric Enterprises in Prescott, Arizona.
https://patch.com/california/lakeelsinore-wildomar/amp/34590998/airplane-crash-lands-in-riverside-county-firefighters-handle-leaking-fuel
Plane Veers Off Runway at Double Eagle, Rescue Crews Called to Scene
By newsdesk
On August 5, 2026 at 10:39am Albuquerque Fire Rescue was dispatched to the Double Eagle Airport for a 51D-4, aircraft crash on landing. AFR’s Alarm Room received
reports of an aircraft that landed and then veered off the runway. AFR dispatched 9 units and two units from BCFR Station 66. Engine 22 arrived on scene and confirmed an aircraft off the runway. The aircraft was upright and was not on fire. Two occupants of the aircraft had self-extricated prior to AFR arrival. No injuries were reported.
No fire suppression efforts or medical needs were required. The aircraft was stable and wasn’t leaking fuel. AFR turned the scene over to Double Eagle Operations to continue to process the event.
https://abqraw.com/post/plane-veers-off-runway-at-double-eagle-rescue-crews-called-to-sign/
Plane lands in field near Longmont airport
Neither of the 2 people on plane was injured, city spokesperson says
By Abigail Ankeney
A plane made an unplanned landing in a field east of Longmont’s Vance Brand Municipal Airport on Tuesday morning. 
The plane, a Mooney M20E, landed east of the runway at Vance Brand about 8:50 a.m. after the pilot reported an engine issue during takeoff, according to a preliminary statement provided by the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA didn’t immediately confirm whether the plane took off from Vance Brand but said it took off about 8:50 a.m. as well.
Neither of the two people on the plane was injured, and there was no fire at the landing site, city of Longmont spokesperson Sandra Seader wrote in an email around 10:20 a.m.
The flight was for “general aviation,” according to the FAA.
The National Transportation Safety Board also received reports of the incident, according to NTSB spokesperson Sarah Taylor Sulick, who directed the Times-Call to local officials for more information.
The plane could not be moved from where it landed until the FAA investigates, according to Seader. The plane — a small, white-with-blue-wings aircraft with tail number N3264F — had been moved from the field and was on airport property by 3 p.m.
A preliminary incident report is expected as soon as Wednesday, according to the FAA.
More information, including any damages and identifying information about the two people in the plane, was not available.
FAA Issues Emergency Medical Kit Modernization Proposal
Proposal Would Allow Airline Operators To Tailor Kit Contents And Crew Training
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a rule to modernize requirements for emergency medical kits (EMK) on commercial airplanes, ensuring crew members have up-to-date resources to handle the most common in-flight emergencies. 
Under the proposed rule, the FAA would transition away from a rigid, prescriptive checklist of medical items. Instead, the agency would adopt a flexible, performance-based standard that allows airline operators to tailor kit contents and crew training to evolve with modern medical science.
Members of the public and aviation stakeholders will have 60 days to submit comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register.
Based on recommendations from the Aerospace Medical Association, the rule recommends equipping EMKs with sufficient resources to manage nine life-threatening conditions:
- Cardiac emergencies
- Breathing difficulties
- Gastrointestinal emergencies
- Opioid overdoses
- Childbirth
- Seizures
- Anaphylaxis (severe allergic reactions)
- Major bleeding
- Hypoglycemia
To ensure medical equipment remains aligned with healthcare advancements, the FAA would evaluate and revise EMK standards and flight-crew training guidelines every five years. This action would fulfill Section 368 of the Congressional FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, which directed the agency to update emergency kit requirements.
FMI: www.faa.gov

NTSB: Bering Air Crash Attributed To Excess Aircraft Weight/Improper Airspeed
NTSB Said Pilot Workload In Severe Icing Conditions Degraded Situational Awareness Leading To Airspeed Decay And Stall
Inadequate airspeed management during severe icing conditions, combined with an airplane above its maximum gross weight, led to the February 2025 crash of a Bering Air flight near Nome, Alaska, killing 10, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said Thursday.
Bering Air Flight 445, a Textron Aviation Cessna 208B Caravan, was on the final leg of a scheduled commuter flight and heading to Nome when it crashed onto pack ice about 12 miles offshore of Norton Sound on Feb. 6, 2025. The pilot and all nine passengers were killed.
The NTSB found the airplane encountered more severe icing conditions than forecast, including large supercooled water droplets. Investigators used archived electronic data from various onboard avionics systems to determine that the airplane's ice protection system functioned as designed and prevented significant ice accumulation on protected surfaces.
The NTSB said managing the airplane's ice protection system increased the pilot's workload when preparing for an approach to Nome Airport, which had temporarily closed its runways for deicing. The NTSB determined those demands degraded the pilot's situational awareness, which led to the airspeed decay until the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall from which the pilot did not recover. The airplane's operation above its maximum gross weight further reduced its stall margin, leaving less room for recovery.
"The tragedy of Flight 445 was not the result of a single failure, but a series of preventable breakdowns that eroded critical safety margins," said NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy, who was on scene in Nome. "I’ve seen how Alaskan communities use aviation as a lifeline. Once implemented, our recommendations will make that lifeline safer and prevent other communities from experiencing similar heartbreak.”
The investigation also found that Bering Air's flight risk assessment and operational control procedures failed to prevent routine overweight operations. Investigators identified a pattern of underreported aircraft weights on company load manifests, with several flights operating above weight limitations.
In addition, the investigation found the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did not increase its oversight of Bering Air despite the operator's rapid growth and increased operational complexity following the pandemic and the bankruptcy of a major competitor.
The NTSB issued new safety recommendations to the FAA, including calling for most charter, air taxi, and fractional ownership operators to provide pilots with training on how to prevent and recover from a loss of control in flight.
The NTSB also reiterated previous recommendations calling for certificated dispatchers for most Part 135 operators, expanded use of flight data monitoring programs, broader load manifest requirements for Part 135 operations, and crash-resistant flight recorder systems for certain aircraft.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov

Today in History
21 Years ago today: On 6 August 2005 Tuninter flight 1153, an ATR 72-202, crashed into the sea after a los of engine power due to fuel exhaustion, killing 16 occupants; 23 survived the accident.
| Date: | Saturday 6 August 2005 |
| Time: | 15:40 |
| Type: | ATR 72-202 |
| Owner/operator: | Tuninter |
| Registration: | TS-LBB |
| MSN: | 258 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1991 |
| Total airframe hrs: | 29893 hours |
| Cycles: | 35259 flights |
| Engine model: | P&W Canada PW124B |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 16 / Occupants: 39 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | 26 km NE off Palermo-Punta Raisi Airport (PMO) - Italy |
| Phase: | En route |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | Bari Karol Wojtyla Airport (BRI/LIBD) |
| Destination airport: | Djerba-Melita Airport (DJE/DTTJ) |
| Investigating agency: | ANSV |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:
Tuninter flight 1153, an ATR 72-202, crashed into the sea after a los of engine power due to fuel exhaustion, killing 16 occupants; 23 survived the accident.
On August 5, 2005 Tuninter's ATR-72 TS-LBB arrived at Tunis Airport with 790 kg of fuel left in the fuel tanks. During maintenance the Fuel Quantity Indicator (FQI) was changed. Erroneously the FQI for ATR-42 aircraft was installed. The normal operation of the FQI is to processes the signal coming from the capacitance probes installed in the tanks with an algorithm typical for each aircraft, depending on tank shape, size and number of probes installed. The indication of the amount of fuel on board the airplane now read 3050 kg instead of 790 kg.
On August 6 the airplane was prepared for flight 152F to Bari. An amount of 465 kg fuel was added for the flight (total fuel: 1255 kg, with 3800 kg indicated). Upon landing at Bari only 305 kg were left in the tanks. Normally this should have triggered a 'LO LVL' warning, but the FQI read 2300 kg, which made the crew believe they had plenty of fuel left. In preparation for the flight to Djerba, just 265 kg of fuel was added. The flight departed with 2700 kg of fuel indicated by the FQI (actual amount: 570 kg).
En route, at 15:24 the crew contacted Palermo for an emergency landing. They had run out of fuel and both engines had quit. Their FQI nevertheless showed 1800 kg of fuel. They did not make it to Palermo and ditched in the sea around 15:40.
CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS:
The accident under examination, as most aviation accidents, has been determined by a series of events linked one another, which caused the final ditching. The ditching was primarly due to the both engines flame out because of fuel exhaustion.
The incorrect replacement of the fuel quantity indicator (FQI) was one of the contributing factors which led irremediably to the accident.
The accident's cause is therefore traceable firstly to the incorrect procedure used for replacing the FQI, by means of the operator's maintenance personnel. This shall be considered the disruptive element, which caused the final ditching of the aircraft due to the lack of fuel that caused the shutdown of both engines.
As said before the accident was determined by a series of events (contributing factors) linked one another. Hereafter are listed some considered of major importance.
- Errors committed by ground mechanics when searching for and correctly identifying the fuel indicator.
- Errors committed by the flight crew: non-respect of various operational procedures.
- Inadequate checks by the competent office of the operator that flight crew were respecting operational procedures.
- Inaccuracy of the information entered in the aircraft management and spares information system and the absence of an effective control of the system itself.
- Inadequate training for aircraft management and spares information system use and absence of a responsible person appointed for managing the system itself.
- Maintenance and organization standards of the operator unsatisfactory for an adequate aircraft management.
- Lack of an adequate quality assurance system;
- Inadequate surveillance of the operator by the competent Tunisian authority.
- Installation characteristics of fuel quantity indicators (FQI) for ATR 42 and ATR 72 which made it possible to install an ATR 42 type FQI in an ATR 72, and viceversa.
The analysis of various factors that contributed to the event has been carried out according to the so called Reasons "Organizational accident" model. Active failures, which had triggered the accident, are those committed both by ground mechanics/technicians the day before the event while searching for and replacing the fuel quantity indicator, and by the crew who did not verify and fully and accurately complete the aircrafts documentation, through which it would have been possible to perceive an anomalous situation regarding the quantity of fuel onboard.
Latent failures, however, remained concealed, latent in the operator's organizational system until, some active errors (by mechanics and pilots) were made, overcoming the system's defence barriers, causing the accident.
Analysing latent and active failures (errors) traceable to various parties, involved in the event in several respects, it clearly emerges that they were operating in a potentially deceptive organizational system. When latent failures remain within a system without being identified and eliminated, the possibility of mutual interaction increases, making the system susceptible for active failures, or not allowing the system to prevent them, in case of errors. Active failures were inserted in a context characterised by organizational and maintenance deficiencies.
The error that led to the accident was committed by mechanics who searched for and replaced the FQI, but this error occurred in an organizational setting in which, if everybody were operating correctly, probably the accident would not have occurred.
Inaccuracy of information entered in the aircraft management and spares information system, particularly regarding the interchangeability of items and the absence of an effective control of the system itself, has been considered in fact one of the latent failures that contributed to the event. The maintenance and organization standards of the operator, at the time of event, were not considered satisfactory for an adequate management of the aircraft.
