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American Flight AA5702 Declares Emergency, Returns to Jacksonville
By Len Varley
American Eagle flight AA5702, an ERJ-145 bound for Charlotte, has declared an emergency and returned to Jacksonville Albert J. Ellis Airport (OAJ).
An American Eagle regional flight en route to Charlotte, NC has declared an emergency and conducted a return to Jacksonville on 3 June.
American flight AA5702, operated by Piedmont Airlines ERJ-145, had departed from Jacksonville Albert J. Ellis Airport (OAJ). The flight was a regular scheduled service bound for Charlotte Douglas International Airport (CLT).
Flight data shows that flight AA5702 had made an on-time departure out of Jacksonville Albert J. Ellis Airport at 19:51 local time this evening. The flight had then set course normally for Charlotte.
As the aircraft approached the South Carolina border en route to Charlotte, flight crew declared an emergency squawking transponder code 7700.
The flight had terminated its climb at flight level FL140 prior to the emergency declaration. A descent and direct return to the origin airport Albert J. Ellis Airport (OAJ) was then carried out.
00:25 UTC: Landed Jacksonville (OAJ)
Having expedited a return after declared an emergency enroute to Charlotte, American flight AA5702 has now landed at Jacksonville. Flight AA5702 made an approach and landing on runway 05 Albert J. Ellis Airport. The nature of the emergency prompting the return is not yet known.
The aircraft conducting the AA5702 rotation to Charlotte today was an Embraer ERJ-145, registered N693AE. This is a 20.7 year old regional jet owned by American Eagle. Piedmont Airlines operate the aircraft on behalf of the carrier.
Update: Possible Hydraulic Failure
According to the online source Flight Emergency, flight AA5702 may have suffered a hydraulic system fault, which prompted the emergency declaration and precautionary return to Jacksonville this evening.
https://aviationsourcenews.com/american-flight-aa5702-declares-emergency-returns-to-jacksonville/
MORE Re: EV BLANKETS - IMPORTANT (The Secret List)
All,
Additional information based upon the recent previous studies: the IAFF recommends that Firefighters not use fire blankets on EV fires involving the battery.
Electric vehicle (EV) fires have presented unique suppression challenges to the fire service. Anecdotal information describes these fires as burning hotter and for longer periods than gasoline-powered cars, with an additional threat of reignition lasting for months. In response to these challenges, numerous products claim to improve suppression efforts involving EVs. Many of these claims have not been substantiated through independent scientific testing. Appropriate product standards have not yet been updated to address these products, and in some cases, new standards have yet to be proposed or developed.
Two major research initiatives, UL Fire Safety Research Institute (FSRI) and the NFPA Fire Protection Foundation (FPRF), are conducting experiments that simulate fire department responses to EV fires and evaluate the effectiveness of various suppression tactics and products. The IAFF is actively involved in both projects. While it will take time for the researchers to develop the final reports, they have learned critical information that needs to be shared immediately before the final publication of these reports.
The IAFF strongly urges all fire service members NOT to deploy a fire blanket for suppression efforts when responding to an EV fire. This recommendation is based on the experiences resulting from both projects and shared in this joint statement issued on May 30, 2025.
While deploying a blanket can control a fire by eliminating oxygen – a smothering effect – it does not stop the battery from experiencing thermal runaway and releasing flammable gases, including hydrogen. Although eliminating oxygen may stop flaming, the ongoing release of flammable gases can build up beneath a fire blanket and create an explosion hazard. Determining if the EV’s battery is involved is a multi-step process, but it must begin with life safety of the driver, occupants, Firefighters and responders as the top priority.
When encountering a fire involving an EV, firefighters should use water to initially knock down the body of fire and then assess for battery involvement. Indicators include persistent flaming from the wheel wells and from underneath the vehicle that resist hose stream extinguishment, jetting flames accompanied by hissing and popping sounds, and reignition.
NOTE:
WATCH for the upcoming IAFF Energy Hazard Guide that will provide loads of info and will be available to all Firefighters and Departments. We will share it here as well.
DOWNLOAD:
IAFF Safety Advisory
USE OF FIRE BLANKETS ON ELECTRIC VEHICLE FIRES
https://www.iaff.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/2025-06-03-Safety-Advisory-4.pdf
DOWNLOAD
HERE IS THE PREVIOUS BULLETIN FROM LAST WEEK
https://fsri.org/news/potential-hazard-involving-ev-fire-blankets
Take Care. Be Careful. Pass It On.
BillyG
The Secret List 6/3/2025-1613 Hours
NTSB Announces Live Public Hearing on Alaska Airlines Door-Plug Incident
Board will vote on probable cause and safety recommendations.
Mark Phelps
The National Transportation Safety Board
reported today it has scheduled a public meeting for June 24 “to determine the probable cause of the in-flight separation of a mid-exit door plug on a Boeing 737-9 passenger airplane near Portland, Oregon, last year.” On Jan. 5, 2024, Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 experienced the in-flight failure of the emergency exit door plug en route from Portland International Airport in Oregon. The practically new Boeing 737-9 landed safely and no one was seriously injured.
As part of the meeting agenda, board members, led by chair Jennifer Homendy, will discuss the investigation and vote on the official probable cause of the incident. They will also issue safety recommendations “to prevent similar accidents.” A synopsis of the meeting will be made available to the press after the meeting and the final report will follow “in several weeks,” at NTSB.gov.
The NTSB invites the press and public to access a live webcast of the proceedings.
NTSB Prelim: Beech 95-B55
Pilot Made A Radio Call To The BJC Control Tower Stating, “We Had A Door Pop, We Need To Come Back Around.”
Location: Broomfield, CO Accident Number: CEN25FA178
Date & Time: May 17, 2025, 10:03 Local Registration: N4321Z
Aircraft: Beech 95-B55 (T42A) Injuries: 2 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
On May 17, 2025, about 1003 mountain daylight time, a Beechcraft 95-B55, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Broomfield, Colorado. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The flight was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to family members, the owner was providing a cross-country familiarity flight to the pilot-rated passenger who had recently purchased a similar airplane. Preliminary air traffic control (ATC) radar data showed the airplane depart runway 30R from the Rocky Mountain Metro Airport (BJC), Broomfield, about 1000. Shortly after rotation, the pilot made a radio call to the BJC control tower stating, “we had a door pop, we need to come back around.” ATC subsequently replied that the pilot could make “right closed traffic for 30R” along with asking the pilot are “you going to climb?”
Airport surveillance camera footage and radar data showed the airplane stopped its initial climb at 6,024 ft mean sea level (msl), about 400 ft above ground level, shortly after passing the departure end of runway 30R. ATC made numerous attempts to elicit a response from the pilot stating that they were cleared to land runway 30R and further cleared the pilot to land the airplane on any runway. The airplane entered the right traffic pattern for runway 30R, as instructed, and started a continuous slow descent. During the right crosswind to downwind turn, the airplane slowed from 94 knots (kts) groundspeed at 1002:12 to 81 kts about 15 seconds later.
At 1002:49, surveillance camera video from a bus stop along U.S. Route 36, located near the right downwind traffic pattern leg, captured the airplane with the landing gear extended entering a left bank that increased in roll rate until the airplane was in an inverted left wing down and nose low dive at 1002:53. The surveillance video shows what appears to be an open door, consistent with the pilot’s report to ATC.
The accident site was in a flat open field about 1.5 nautical miles north of runway 30R. Impact marks and debris were consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in an estimated 90° left bank and nose down attitude. During the impact, the airplane rotated counterclockwise 180° opposite the direction of travel and came to rest upright. The debris field was about 85 ft in length with evidence of a postaccident fire.
The main cabin door was separated from the airplane, located on the left side of the debris path, and the door handle was found in the open position (see Figure 2). The rear sloped latch, lower pin, and upper claw latch were found in the locked position.
The components of the cabin baggage door thumb latch were located in the fuselage debris, and the latch was found in the closed and locked position. The nose baggage door could not be identified due to impact fragmentation of the forward fuselage. Flight control continuity was established from all flight control surfaces to their respective controls.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
Today in History
58 Years ago today: On 4 June 1967 A British Midland Airways Canadair C-4 Argonaut crashed on approach to Manchester Airport, United Kingdom, killing 72 occupants; twelve survived.
| Date: | Sunday 4 June 1967 |
| Time: | 09:09 |
| Type: | Canadair C-4 Argonaut |
| Owner/operator: | British Midland Airways - BMA |
| Registration: | G-ALHG |
| MSN: | 153 |
| Year of manufacture: | 1949 |
| Engine model: | Rolls-Royce Merlin 622 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 72 / Occupants: 84 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | Stockport - United Kingdom |
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi |
| Departure airport: | Palma de Mallorca Airport (PMI/LEPA) |
| Destination airport: | Manchester International Airport (MAN/EGCC) |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:
A British Midland Airways Canadair C-4 Argonaut crashed on approach to Manchester Airport, United Kingdom, killing 72 occupants; twelve survived.
The C-4 Argonaut aircraft operated a charter flight from Manchester, United Kingdom to Palma de Mallorca, Spain and return. It landed at Palma at 02:20 hours UTC, was refuelled and took off for Manchester at 04:06 hours UTC. The co-pilot was flying the aircraft from the right-hand seat and the flight was uneventful.
Approach
Between 08:56 and 09:00 the aircraft was descending for approach and landing and was being vectored towards the ILS localizer of runway 24. At 09:01:30 the flight was informed that it was 9 miles from touchdown and well left of the centre line and it was asked if it was receiving the ILS. The pilot-in-command replied that he was and would turn right a little. Shortly thereafter one engine, most probably No.4, stopped delivering power, followed some 15 seconds later by the other engine on the same wing. The pilot-in-command took over the controls and just after 09:03 the controller told the flight that it was 6 miles from touchdown and asked if it was established on the ILS localizer. This message was not acknowledged by the flight and 7 seconds later the controller asked if it was still receiving. The pilot-in-command then replied "Hotel Golf is overshooting, we've got a little bit of trouble with rpm".
Go around
The aircraft's air speed was then only 116 kt and its height 1838 ft AMSL. The controller then ordered the pilot-in-command to turn left on to 160°M and climb to 2500 ft QNH. He then asked the reason for overshooting and was told "We've a little bit of trouble with rpm, will advise you". At 09:03:51 the captain asked what the left turn was on to. The controller noted that the aircraft had already turned through 25° to the right instead of to the left, so he ordered the pilot to continue turning right on to 020 degrees and climb to 2500 ft on QNH. This was acknowledged by the co-pilot. At 09:04:41 the controller asked the flight to advise when ready to recommence the approach. By this time the aircraft's IAS had dropped to 111 kt, its height to 1287 ft QNH, and it had broken cloud. Thereafter it flew below cloud in conditions of reasonable visibility. At 09:05:26 the controller told the flight that it was 7 miles from the airfield on a bearing of 040 degrees and requested its height. The flight reported at 1000 ft. This was the first indication to the controller that the aircraft was faced with an emergency and after checking that the height given was correct he put full emergency procedure into operation at the airfield and ordered the aircraft to turn right on to 180 M, so that it would close the ILS localizer.
Loss of altitude
At 09:05:47 the controller asked the flight if it could maintain height. The pilot-in-command now at 981 ft AMSL and only some 800 ft above the ground replied "just about". He was told he was 8 miles from touchdown and should continue his right turn on to 200 degrees M and maintain as much height as possible. At this point 341 ft of height were lost in 10 seconds after the TAS had fallen to 100 kt and the pilot-in-command said he was not able to maintain height at the moment. The controller told him that he was 8 miles from touchdown and closing the ILS localizer from the right. At 09:07:09, the controller informed the flight that radar contact had been lost due to the aircraft's low height and asked the pilot to adjust his heading on the ILS and report when established. The co-pilot replied that they had "the lights to our right" and were at 800 ft, just maintaining height, and the pilot-in-command asked for the emergency to be laid on. At 09:07:35 the pilot-in-command requested his position and was told 7,5 miles to run to touchdown. Half a minute later the controller repeated that he had no radar contact, and cleared the flight for landing, the surface wind being 270°/12 kt. At this stage the PAR controller, who had overheard that the Approach controller had lost radar contact, saw a contact at the bottom of his elevation display, and told the flight that it was 6 miles from touchdown. The co-pilot then gave their altitude as being 500 ft. The terrain clearance was only 300 ft and the IAS was below 105 kt and falling. The aircraft was approximately on the line of the ILS localizer and heading for the very centre of the built up area of Stockport. A few seconds after 09:09 hours the aircraft struck the ground more or less level in pitch, slightly right wing down, and slightly yawed to the right. The left wing struck a 3-storey building and was ripped off, causing the aircraft to crash in a small relatively open space near tall blocks of flats and other buildings.
PROBABLE CAUSE: "The immediate cause of the accident was loss of power of both engines on the starboard side resulting in control problems which prevented the pilot from maintaining height on the available power with one propeller windmilling. The loss of power of the first engine was due to fuel starvation due to inadvertent fuel transfer in flight. The loss of power of the second engine was due either to fuel starvation resulting from inadvertent fuel transfer in flight or to misidentification by the crew of which engine had failed followed by failure to restore power in time to the engine misidentified as having failed.
Contributory causes of the accident were:
(a) The design of the fuel valves and location in the cockpit of their actuating levers, so that a failure by the pilot correctly to position the lever by an amount so small as to be easy to do and difficult to recognize would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale sufficient to involve the risk after a long flight of a tank expected to contain sufficient fuel being in fact empty.
(b) Failure of those responsible for the design of the fuel system or the fuel valves to warn users that failure by a small amount to place the actuating levers in the proper position would result in inadvertent fuel transfer on a scale involving this risk after a long flight.
(c) Failure of British Midland's air crew or engineers to recognize the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in the air from the evidence available in previous incidents in flight and contained in the fuel logs.
(d) Failure of other operators of Argonauts who had learned by experience of the possibility of inadvertent fuel transfer in flight to inform the Air Registration Board, the Directorate of Flight Safety of the Board of Trade or its predecessors, or the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee of the facts which they had learned so that these might be communicated to other operators of Argonauts and other aircraft equipped with similar systems and fuel cocks."
