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Plane makes emergency landing in Williamson County woods after taking off from Murfreesboro
The pilot was able to land safely with no reported injuries.
FRANKLIN, Tenn. (WSMV) - The Williamson
County Sheriff’s Office reports several agencies are in the area of an emergency plane landing on Tuesday morning.
WCSO reports that the plane landed in a wooded area of McKee Padilla Road.
Deputies received word of the plane, which departed from Murfreesboro, make an emergency landing in the area at about 11:15 a.m.
Williamson County Sheriff's Office TN
Community Alert: Residents in the area of McKee Padilla Road in Williamson County may notice an increased presence of emergency personnel over the next few hours. Please avoid the area if possible.
At approximately 11:15 a.m. this morning, the Williamson County Sheriff’s Office received reports of an aircraft that departed from Murfreesboro, Tennessee, made an emergency landing in the area.
The aircraft was located by WCSO Air-One Pilot, Lieutenant Justin Long, who confirmed there was one occupant on board. The pilot landed safely and reported no injuries.
The aircraft was found by WCSO pilot Lt. Justin Long, who confirmed there was one occupant on board.
The pilot was able to land safely with no reported injuries.
FAA takes action to address 737 Max cabin overheating concern
By Jon Hemmerdinger
The Federal Aviation Administration has issued an immediately effective order to address risks posed by a problem with the 737 Max’s environmental control system that can cause the jets’ cabins to become dangerously hot.
Boeing says the issue stems from a “ground wire
fault”. It is developing an “engineering solution”.
The FAA issued an airworthiness directive (AD) on 24 February in response to two events involving “excessive cabin and flight deck temperatures that could not be controlled by the flight crew using existing procedures”, the document says.
The agency is giving operators of all in-service 737 Max – Max 8s, Max 8-200s and Max 9s – 30 days to update aircraft flight manuals to include procedures pilots should follow to address the issue.
The order takes effect immediately, bypassing the FAA’s typical process of proposing rules and accepting comments prior to making them final. The FAA is, however, accepting public comments through 10 April.
“The risk to the flying public justifies forgoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule,” it says.
“We support the FAA’s airworthiness directive, which mandates guidance provided by Boeing in January 2026. We are advancing an engineering solution to eliminate the possibility of this electrical fault,” Boeing says.
The “engineering solution will be incorporated into the 737 Max 8 and 737 Max 9 and [be] ready for the 737 Max 7 and 737 Max 10 prior to certification,” Boeing adds. “We do not anticipate this issue to affect the certification timeline.”
The company has said it expects the long-delayed Max 7 and Max 10 to be certificated this year.
An investigation into the two events traced the problem to a tripped circuit breaker in the jets’ standby power control unit. That circuit provides power to air conditioning and cabin pressure functions, the FAA’s order says.
The tripped circuit “causes an unintended erroneous electrical ground signal” that commands actuators to close both the 737 Max’s “ram air deflectors doors”. Those doors cover inlets that funnel cooling air to the jets’ air conditioning heat exchangers.
When the doors close, the 737’s air system can “supply excessively hot air to the cabin and flight deck”, possibly leading to “uncontrollable, excessively high temperature”, says the FAA.
“This condition, if not addressed, could lead to injury or incapacitation of flight crew and passengers,” it adds.
Boeing tells FlightGlobal it has determined “the root cause to be a ground wire fault in the air conditioning system”. It says previous-generation 737s are unaffected.
The FAA’s order requires operates to revise aircraft flight manuals to include new “non-normal” checklists that specify how pilots should respond to tripped breakers and “excessively hot” temperatures.
https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/faa-takes-action-to-address-737-max-cabin-overheating-concern/166423.article
House rejects bipartisan Senate aviation safety bill crafted after fatal jet, Army helicopter crash
The House's 264-133 vote on the ROTOR Act was just one short of the two-thirds majority required for passage under suspension of the rules
By Natalia Mittelstadt
The House has rejected a bipartisan Senate aviation safety bill that was in response to the January 2025 midair collision between an American Airlines plane and an Army Black Hawk helicopter near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
The House's 264-133 vote Tuesday on the ROTOR Act – just one short of the two-thirds majority required for passage under suspension of the rules, which is used for legislation expected to easily pass, Roll Call reported.
The Defense Department had raised national security concerns about the bill on Monday.
Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ted Cruz introduced the ROTOR Act, which would require all aircraft to be equipped with specific location transmission technology, known as ADS-B In, and repeal certain military exemptions from the technology requirements. The Senate had passed the bill by unanimous consent.
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Rep. Sam Graves and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Rep. Mike D. Rogers, Republicans, urged opposition on the floor on Monday. On Tuesday, 132 Republicans opposed the bill, and Democratic Rep. Lizzie Fletcher of Texas was the only member of her party opposed to the bill.
Fletcher posted on X on Tuesday that she has been voting against bills brought to the House floor under suspension of the rules this year because "to the extent that these kinds of bills suggest that Congress is working & functioning as it should, I am using my no vote to make clear that this Congress is failing to perform its most essential function: preserving and protecting the people of this country and our sacred Constitution."
Cruz was on the House floor with House Speaker Mike Johnson ahead of the vote to try to whip members in favor of the bill, then released a statement after it failed to pass.
The Pentagon said on Monday that the bill would “create significant unresolved budgetary burdens and operational security risks affecting national defense activities.”
Graves and Rogers brought up concerns about the bill on the floor, noting the lack of House committee consideration of the bill.
They were part of a bipartisan group that released their own legislation last week, called the ALERT Act, that they said was more “comprehensive,” and criticized the Senate bill for taking a “premature” and “overly prescriptive” approach.
Graves on Tuesday committed to a markup of the ALERT Act “as soon as next week.”
“If the ROTOR Act is not approved by the House today, I commit to the supporters of that legislation, to the accident victims’ families, and to the aviation community, that the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee will mark up the ALERT Act as soon as next week and work with our colleagues in the Senate to get this right,” Graves said. “Safety will always be my number one priority, which is why it is vital that we address the NTSB’s recommendations in a timely manner.”
National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy had supported the ROTOR Act, saying before the vote that the bill could have prevented the crash if it had been law at the time.
"The ROTOR Act would've saved lives; unlike claims that this is 'emotional legislation,' the FAA had over two decades to Act and failed to do so," Homendy posted on X on Tuesday. "Had they acted, we wouldn't be here today; families would have their loved ones. How many more people need to die before we Act?"
American Airlines 737 plane found with apparent bullet hole after flight from Miami to Colombia
By Kris Van Cleave
An American Airlines plane was found with an apparent bullet hole while in Colombia on Monday, according to sources familiar with the matter and documents reviewed by CBS News.
The hole was located in the right wing of a 737 MAX 8 aircraft after it flew from Miami, Florida, to Medellín on Sunday evening as flight 923. After landing, the ground crew reported a puncture "that extends all the way through the right-hand aileron," documents reviewed by CBS News said. It's unclear when or where the damage occurred.
Sources say the damage is consistent with an apparent bullet strike. There is an entry point that left a small round hole in one side of the aileron as well as damage at the likely exit point on the other side. The apparent bullet hole was first reported by airline blogger JonNYC on X.
An aircraft's ailerons are important flight control surfaces located on the trailing edge of each wing. They generate the aircraft's roll.
There were no injuries and the plane experienced no flight-related issues, according to American Airlines.
"Following a routine inspection, our teams identified a puncture to the exterior of one of our aircraft in Medellín, Colombia," American Airlines said in a statement to CBS News. "The aircraft was immediately removed from service for further inspection and repair. We will work closely with all relevant authorities to investigate this incident."
Temporary repairs were made and the plane operated as scheduled to Miami on Monday morning, according to flight tracking data from Flightradar24. It then remained in Florida for approximately 12 hours before flying to Dallas and has not flown since.
The Civil Aviation Authority — the Colombian equivalent of the Federal Aviation Administration — told CBS News it had no information about the incident but was now investigating.
In 2024, Spirit, JetBlue and American had planes struck by gunfire while taking off or landing in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, as gang violence surged in the capital city. The FAA temporarily halted air traffic to Toussaint Louverture International Airport and major airlines suspended service.
José Diaz contributed to this report.
https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/american-airlines-737-plane-found-with-apparent-bullet-hole-while-in-colombia/
NTSB Final Report: Cessna 182F
At The Conclusion Of A Flight To Break In Newly Installed Cylinders, The Pilot Returned To The Departure Airport
Location: Anchorage, Alaska Accident Number: ANC25LA017
Date & Time: February 2, 2025, 13:54 Local Registration: N3206U
Aircraft: Cessna 182F Aircraft Damage: Substantial
Defining Event: Fuel starvation Injuries: 2 None
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
Analysis: At the conclusion of a flight to break in newly installed cylinders, the pilot returned to the departure airport and entered the traffic pattern. The pilot reported moving the fuel selector valve from Right to Both as he approached the airport. As he entered the downwind leg, he said the airplane began to run rough, and the exhaust gas temperature (EGT) rose, so he applied full carburetor heat.
Shortly after turning onto final approach, the engine lost total power and the pilot made a forced landing to a vacant parking lot. After landing, the airplane contacted a curb and the nose gear separated from the airplane, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage and engine mount.
The pilot reported that he visually inspected the fuel quantity before takeoff but did not verify the amount of fuel in the wing tanks with the airplane’s dip stick fuel gauge. He stated that the last time the airplane was fueled was six weeks before the accident flight. The total amount of fuel onboard before takeoff could not be confirmed. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel tanks and lines were intact and there was no evidence of fuel leakage. The right wing tank was empty and the left wing tank contained about 6 gallons of fuel.
Examination of the engine and fuel system did not reveal evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation. The recorded engine data indicated that, during the last minute of the flight, the EGT increased slightly and then began to drop, along with the cylinder head temperature (CHT), consistent with fuel starvation and a subsequent total loss of engine power.
The pilot stated he did not lean the fuel mixture during the flight, which likely led to a higherthan-calculated fuel burn rate compared to the performance charts for that make and model of airplane. Due to the low fuel state, when the pilot conducted the right turn the fuel tank likely became unported, resulting in a total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation.
Probable Cause and Findings: The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be -- The pilot’s inadequate fuel planning, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
Today in History
17 Years ago today: On 25 February 2009 THY Turkish Airlines flight 1951, a Boeing 737-800, crashed while on approach to Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport, Netherlands, killing 9 occupants; 126 survived the accident.
| Date: | Wednesday 25 February 2009 |
| Time: | 10:26 |
| Type: | Boeing 737-8F2 |
| Owner/operator: | THY Turkish Airlines |
| Registration: | TC-JGE |
| MSN: | 29789/1065 |
| Year of manufacture: | 2002 |
| Engine model: | CFMI CFM56-7B26 |
| Fatalities: | Fatalities: 9 / Occupants: 135 |
| Other fatalities: | 0 |
| Aircraft damage: | Destroyed, written off |
| Category: | Accident |
| Location: | 1,5 km N of Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS) - Netherlands |
| Phase: | Approach |
| Nature: | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure airport: | Istanbul-Atatürk Airport (ISL/LTBA) |
| Destination airport: | Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS/EHAM) |
| Investigating agency: | Dutch Safety Board |
| Confidence Rating: | Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
Narrative:
THY Turkish Airlines flight 1951, a Boeing 737-800, crashed while on approach to Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport, Netherlands, killing 9 occupants; 126 survived the accident.
Flight TK1951 departed Istanbul-Atatrk
International Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful.
The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8500 ft. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded.
The aircraft continued and was then directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when permitted by ATC.
Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above.
The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and autothrottle engaged.
The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through 1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded.
This could be seen on the captainÂ’s (left-hand) primary flight display. The first officerÂ’s (right-hand) primary flight display, by contrast, indicated the correct height, as provided by the right-hand system. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorised the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one, and did not record any error. In turn, this meant that it was the erroneous altitude reading that was used by various aircraft systems, including the autothrottle. The crew were unaware of this, and could not have known about it. The manuals for use during the flight did not contain any procedures for errors in the radio altimeter system. In addition, the training that the pilots had undergone did not include any detailed system information that would have allowed them to understand the significance of the problem.
When the aircraft started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the autothrottle moved into the ‘retard flare’ mode. This mode is normally only activated in the final phase of the landing, below 27 feet. This was possible because the other preconditions had also been met, including flaps at (minimum) position 15. The thrust from both engines was accordingly reduced to a minimum value (approach idle). This mode was shown on the primary flight displays as ‘RETARD’. However, the right-hand autopilot, which was activated, was receiving the correct altitude from the right-hand radio altimeter system. Thus the autopilot attempted to keep the aircraft flying on the glide path for as long as possible. This meant that the aircraft’s nose continued to rise, creating an increasing angle of attack of the wings. This was necessary in order to maintain the same lift as the airspeed reduced.
In the first instance, the pilotsÂ’ only indication that the autothrottle would no longer maintain the pre-selected speed of 144 knots was the RETARD display. When the speed fell below this value at a height of 750 feet, they would have been able to see this on the airspeed indicator on the primary flight displays. When subsequently, the airspeed reached 126 knots, the frame of the airspeed indicator also changed colour and started to flash. The artificial horizon also showed that the nose attitude of the aircraft was becoming far too high. The cockpit crew did not respond to these indications and warnings. The reduction in speed and excessively high pitch attitude of the aircraft were not recognised until the approach to stall warning (stick shaker) went off at an altitude of 460 feet.
The first officer responded immediately to the stick shaker by pushing the control column forward and also pushing the throttle levers forward. The captain however, also responded to the stick shaker commencing by taking over control. Assumingly the result of this was that the first officerÂ’s selection of thrust was interrupted. The result of this was that the autothrottle, which was not yet switched off, immediately pulled the throttle levers back again to the position where the engines were not providing any significant thrust. Once the captain had taken over control, the autothrottle was disconnected, but no thrust was selected at that point. Nine seconds after the commencement of the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward, but at that point the aircraft had already stalled and the height remaining, of about 350 feet, was insufficient for a recovery.
According to the last recorded data of the digital flight data recorder the aircraft was in a 22° ANU and 10° Left Wing Down (LWD) position at the moment of impact.
The airplane impacted farmland. The horizontal stabilizer and both main landing gear legs were separated from the aircraft and located near the initial impact point. The left and right engines had detached from the aircraft.
The aft fuselage, with vertical stabilizer, was
broken circumferentially forward of the aft passenger doors and had sustained significant damage. The fuselage had ruptured at the right side forward of the wings. The forward fuselage section, which contained the cockpit and seat rows 1 to 7, had been significantly disrupted. The rear fuselage section was broken circumferentially around row 28.
The Dutch Safety Board has reached the following main conclusion:
During the accident flight, while executing the approach by means of the instrument landing system with the right autopilot engaged, the left radio altimeter system showed an incorrect height of -8 feet on the left primary flight display. This incorrect value of -8 feet resulted in activation of the ‘retard flare’ mode of the autothrottle, whereby the thrust of both engines was reduced to a minimal value (approach idle) in preparation for the last phase of the landing. Due to the approach heading and altitude provided to the crew by air traffic control, the localizer signal was intercepted at 5.5 NM from the runway threshold with the result that the glide slope had to be intercepted from above. This obscured the fact that the autothrottle had entered the retard flare mode. In addition, it increased the crew’s workload. When the aircraft passed 1000 feet height, the approach was not stabilised so the crew should have initiated a go around. The right autopilot (using data from the right radio altimeter) followed the glide slope signal. As the airspeed continued to drop, the aircraft’s pitch attitude kept increasing. The crew failed to recognise the airspeed decay and the pitch increase until the moment the stick shaker was activated. Subsequently the approach to stall recovery procedure was not executed properly, causing the aircraft to stall and crash.
METAR:
09:25 UTC / 10:25 local time:
EHAM 250925Z 20010KT 4500 BR SCT007 BKN008 OVC010 04/03 Q1027 TEMPO 2500=
Wind 200 degrees, 10 kts, visibility 4500 m in mist, scattered clouds 700 ft., broken clouds 800ft, overcast 1,000 ft. temperature 4 deg. C, dewpoint3 deg. C
09:55 UTC / 10:55 local time:
EHAM 250955Z 21010KT 4500 BR BKN007 OVC008 05/04 Q1027 TEMPO 2500=
[Wind 200 degrees, 10 kts, visibity 4500 m in mist, broken clouds 700 f, overcast 800 ft. temperature 5 deg. C, dewpoint 4 deg. C
