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Thursday the 21st of May, 2026

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Delhi-Bengaluru Air India Flight Suffers Tail Strike During Landing, Aircraft Grounded

Air India’s Delhi-Bengaluru flight suffers a tail strike during landing amid wake turbulence; all passengers and crew remain safe.

By :Varun Bhasin

A Delhi-to-Bengaluru Air India flight suffered a tail-strike incident while landing at Kempegowda International Airport, prompting the airline to ground the aircraft for inspection. Despite the mid-landing scare, all passengers and crew members on board flight AI2651 were reported safe, with the aircraft completing its landing without injuries or evacuation. The incident is believed to have been triggered by wake turbulence from another aircraft ahead, which briefly affected the plane’s stability during approach. The development also forced Air India to cancel the return Bengaluru-Delhi service AI2652.

Wake Turbulence Triggers Incident

According to Air India, the aircraft experienced wake turbulence while descending towards Bengaluru airport. Aviation experts describe wake turbulence as disturbed air generated by an aircraft in flight, particularly dangerous for planes approaching from behind during landing or take-off.

The turbulence reportedly impacted the aircraft’s balance moments before touchdown, leading to the tail section scraping the runway-an occurrence known in aviation as a tail strike. Such incidents can potentially damage the aircraft’s rear fuselage and therefore require mandatory technical inspection before further operations.

Air India confirmed that the landing remained fully controlled and safe despite the incident. Passengers and crew disembarked normally after arrival.

Aircraft Grounded

Following the incident, the aircraft was immediately withdrawn from service for detailed engineering checks. As a result, Air India cancelled flight AI2652 from Bengaluru to Delhi.

The airline said alternative travel arrangements were being made for affected passengers, while ground staff at Bengaluru airport were assisting travellers with rebooking and other support services.

Tail strikes are relatively uncommon but remain a serious operational event in commercial aviation. Experts say even minor contact between an aircraft’s tail and the runway can require extensive inspection to rule out structural damage.

https://news.abplive.com/news/air-india-delhi-bengaluru-flight-hits-runway-in-tail-strike-during-landing-1845188

NTSB Urges Pilot Training On Smoke-In-Cockpit Emergencies

Recommendation Follows Bird Strike And Smoke In Cockpit On Southwest Flight

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has issued three safety recommendations aimed at improving pilot preparedness for smoke-in-cockpit emergencies through realistic, scenario-based training.

The recommendations stem from the NTSB’s investigation of a Dec. 20, 2023, incident involving Southwest Airlines flight 554, a Boeing 737-8, on departure from Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport. Shortly after takeoff, a bird was ingested into the airplane’s left engine, followed by smoke rapidly filling the cockpit.

Within seconds, the flight crew reported difficulty seeing flight instruments and checklist items as visibility deteriorated. The pilots donned oxygen masks, completed emergency procedures, declared an emergency and safely returned to the airport. None of the 139 people aboard the airplane were injured.

The crew described the surprise, adrenaline and restricted visibility as far more challenging than anything they had experienced in training. “If such an event occurred at night or in instrument meteorological conditions, the consequences could be catastrophic,” the NTSB determined.

The NTSB noted that although the Federal Aviation Administration receives nearly daily notifications of flights in which crews declare emergencies due to smoke in the cockpit, passenger airlines are not currently required to conduct realistic smoke-in-cockpit simulation training. Existing training often consists only of verbal discussion of a smoke event rather than immersive simulation involving reduced visibility or elevated workload.

Investigators found that current recurrent pilot training may not adequately prepare crews for the workload, stress, limited visibility and time-critical decision-making associated with actual smoke emergencies in the cockpit.

The NTSB recommended that the FAA work with the industry to develop standardized, realistic smoke-in-cockpit simulation training for pilots and incorporate that training into its guidance for overseeing airline training programs.

In addition, the NTSB urged Airlines for America and the Regional Airline Association to share information from the Southwest incident with their member airlines and encourage the use of realistic smoke-event simulations in pilot training.

The seven-page Aviation Investigation Report, AIR-26-03, and the Southwest Airlines incident report? are both available on the NTSB website.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov

 

 

NTSB Report Says Pilot Radioed ‘Abort, Abort’ After Takeoff

Preliminary Report On Crash That Killed North Dakota Lawmaker

An NTSB preliminary report says the pilot of a Beechcraft F33A departing Crystal Airport (MIC) In Minnesota radioed “Abort, abort” and started turning shortly after takeoff before the plane crashed, killing both people aboard.

The passenger on the plane was North Dakota lawmaker Liz Conmy. The pilot was her partner, Joe Cass, a retired surgeon.The April 25 crash happened as Cass and Conmy were traveling from Crystal to Park Rapids (PKD). Cass had flown the single-engine Beechcraft F33A from Park Rapids to Crystal the previous day, and refueled on arrival. The NTSB report says, “The pilot filled the airplane with 18.7 gallons of 100 LL aviation fuel after landing at MIC. According to the pilot’s son, the pilot and his passenger were flying back to PKD when the accident occurred. Air traffic control cleared the pilot to depart runway 32 at MIC and climb out on runway heading. The pilot correctly read back the instructions, and the airplane departed runway 32.

“A recording of air traffic control communications revealed that, shortly after the airplane departed runway 32, the pilot said, ‘Abort, abort, 32X.’ Air traffic control told the pilot that he was cleared to land on any runway. Airport video surveillance captured the airplane in a left turn before it descended behind trees. Shortly after, a plume of black smoke appeared from behind the tree line. The airplane impacted a park within a residential community about 900 feet northwest of the departure end of runway 32. A postimpact fire ensued.”

FMI: www.ntsb.gov

Today in History

26 Years ago today: On 21 May 2000 An East Coast Aviation Services Jetstream 31 crashed near Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, USA while on approach to the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Airport, killing all 19 occupants.

Date: Sunday 21 May 2000
Time: 11:28
Type: British Aerospace 3102 Jetstream 31
Owner/operator: East Coast Aviation Services
Registration: N16EJ
MSN: 834
Year of manufacture: 1988
Total airframe hrs: 13972 hours
Cycles: 18503 flights
Engine model: Garrett TPE331-10UGR-514H
Fatalities: Fatalities: 19 / Occupants: 19
Other fatalities: 0
Aircraft damage: Destroyed, written off
Category: Accident
Location: 18 km S of Wilkes-Barre, PA -    United States of America
Phase: Approach
Nature: Passenger - Non-Scheduled/charter/Air Taxi
Departure airport: Atlantic City International Airport, NJ (ACY/KACY)
Destination airport: Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport, PA (AVP/KAVP)
Investigating agency:  NTSB
Confidence Rating:  Accident investigation report completed and information captured

Narrative:
An East Coast Aviation Services Jetstream 31 crashed near Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, USA while on approach to the Wilkes-Barre/Scranton Airport, killing all 19 occupants.

Jetstream 31 N16EJ departed Farmingdale-Republic Airport (FRG) at 09:21 on a flight to Atlantic City International Airport (ACY), where it arrived at 09:49. The next flight was an on-demand charter flight for Caesar's Palace Casino to Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International Airport (AVP). An IFR flight plan was filed and the flight departed at 10:30.
The pilots first contacted AVP approach controllers at 10:57 and were vectored for an ILS approach to runway 04. The flight was cleared for approach at 11:02:07, and the approach controller advised the pilots that they were 5 nautical miles (nm) from Crystal Lake, which is the initial approach fix (IAF) for the ILS approach to runway 04. The pilots were told to maintain 4,000 feet until established on the localizer. At 11:04:16, the approach controller advised that a previous landing aircraft picked up the airport at minimums [decision altitude]. The pilots were instructed to contact the AVP local (tower) controller at 11:05:09, which they did 3 seconds later. The airplane then descended to about 2,200 feet, flew level at 2,200 feet for about 20 seconds, and began to climb again about 2.2 nm from the runway threshold when a missed approach was executed. At 11:07:26 the captain reported executing the missed approach but provided no explanation to air traffic controllers. The tower controller informed the North Radar approach controllers of the missed approach and then instructed the accident flight crew to fly runway heading, climb to 4,000 feet, and contact approach control. The pilots re-established contact with the approach controllers at 11:08:04 as they climbed through 3,500 feet to 4,000 feet and requested another ILS approach to runway 04. The flight was vectored for another ILS approach, and at 11:10:07 the approach controller advised the pilots of traffic 2 nm miles away at 5,000 feet. The captain responded that they were in the clouds. At 11:14:38, the controller directed the pilots to reduce speed to follow a Cessna 172 on approach to the airport, and the captain responded, "ok we're slowing." The flight was cleared for a second approach at 11:20:45 and advised to maintain 4,000 feet until the airplane was established on the localizer. At 11:23:49 the captain transmitted, "for uh one six echo juliet we'd like to declare an emergency." At 11:23:53, the approach controller asked the nature of the problem, and the captain responded, "engine failure." The approach controller acknowledged the information, informed the pilots that the airplane appeared to be south of the localizer (off course to the right), and asked if they wanted a vector back to the localizer course. The flight crew accepted, and at 11:24:10 the controller directed a left turn to heading 010, which the captain acknowledged. At 11:24:33, the controller asked for verification that the airplane was turning left. The captain responded, "we're trying six echo juliet." At 11:24:38, the controller asked if a right turn would be better. The captain asked the controller to "stand by." At 11:25:07, the controller advised the pilots that the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) in the area was 3,300 feet. At 11:25:12, the captain transmitted, "standby for six echo juliet tell them we lost both engines for six echo juliet." At that time, ATC radar data indicated that the airplane was descending through 3,000 feet. The controller immediately issued the weather conditions in the vicinity of the airport and informed the flight crew about the location of nearby highways. At 11:26:17, the captain asked, "how's the altitude look for where we're at." The controller responded that he was not showing an altitude readout from the airplane and issued the visibility (2.5 miles) and altimeter setting. At 11:26:43, the captain transmitted, "just give us a vector back to the airport please." The controller cleared the accident flight to fly heading 340, advised the flight crew that radar contact was lost, and asked the pilots to verify their altitude. The captain responded that they were "level at 2,000." At 11:26:54, the controller again advised the flight crew of the 3,300-foot MVA and suggested a 330° heading to bring the airplane back to the localizer. At 11:27:14 the controller asked, "do you have any engines," and the captain responded that they appeared to have gotten back "the left engine now." At 11:27:23, the controller informed the pilots that he saw them on radar at 2,000 feet and that there was a ridgeline between them and the airport. The captain responded, "that's us" and "we're at 2,000 feet over the trees." The controller instructed the pilots to fly a 360° heading and advised them of high antennas about 2 nm west of their position. At 11:27:46, the captain transmitted, "we're losing both engines." Two seconds later the controller advised that the Pennsylvania Turnpike was right below the airplane and instructed the flight crew to "let me know if you can get your engines back." There was no further radio contact with the accident airplane. The Jetstream contact trees and impacted terrain at a steep angle and in an extreme bank angle.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The flight crew's failure to ensure an adequate fuel supply for the flight, which led to the stoppage of the right engine due to fuel exhaustion and the intermittent stoppage of the left engine due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew's failure to monitor the airplane's fuel state and the flight crew's failure to maintain directional control after the initial engine stoppage.

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